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ABSTRACT
The operation of Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River affects several
downstream resources and water uses including water supply for consumptive uses
in Arizona, California, and Nevada, hydroelectric power production, endangered
species of native fish, recreational angling for non-native fish, and recreational boat-
ing in the Grand Canyon.  Decisions about the magnitude and timing of water
releases through the dam involve trade-offs between these resources and uses.  The
numerous laws affecting dam operations create a hierarchy of legal priorities that
should govern these decisions.  At the top of the hierarchy are mandatory require-
ments for water storage and delivery and for conservation of endangered species.
Other resources and water uses have lower legal priorities.
The Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (“AMP”) has substi-
tuted collaborative decisionmaking among stakeholders for the hierarchy of priori-
ties created by law.  The AMP has thereby facilitated non-compliance with the
Endangered Species Act by the Bureau of Reclamation, which operates the dam, and
has effectively given hydroelectric power production and non-native fisheries higher
priorities than they are legally entitled to.
Adaptive management is consistent with the laws governing operation of Glen
Canyon Dam, but collaborative decisionmaking is not.  Nor is collaborative deci-
sionmaking an essential, or even logical, component of adaptive management.  As
implemented in the case of Glen Canyon Dam, collaborative decisionmaking has
actually stifled adaptive management by making agreement among stakeholders a
prerequisite to changes in the operation of the dam.  This Article proposes a program
for adaptive, but not collaborative, management of Glen Canyon Dam that would
better conform to the law and would be more amenable to adaptation and experimen-
tation than would the current, stakeholder-centered program.
* Professor of Law and Faculty Fellow, Center for the Study of Law, Science, &
Technology, Arizona State University; Member Scholar, Center for Progressive Reform.  I
would like to thank Rick Johnson, Colorado River Science Director for the Grand Canyon
Trust, for his extensive assistance.  I would also like to thank Neil Levine, attorney for the
Grand Canyon Trust, Professor Robert Adler of the University of Utah, and Dennis Kubly of
the Bureau of Reclamation for their assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Collaboration is all the rage in public resource management.  Virtually
every federal agency with responsibility for managing natural resources has
convened groups of interested parties, usually labeled “stakeholders,” in the
hope that the parties could reach some sort of agreement or consensus on the
course of action that the agency should pursue.  The use of such groups has
both spurred, and been spurred by, the growth of an industry of private consul-
tants who, for a fee, “facilitate” such groups by organizing and leading meet-
ings.  For the most part, the use of such groups by federal agencies has met
with praise by observers in academia and the press.  Some critics, however,
have questioned the effectiveness of such groups as well as the appropriateness
of invoking collaboration among private parties to make decisions about public
resources.
This Article examines the role of one such collaborative effort, the Glen
Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program (“AMP”), in the operation of
Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River.  The operation of Glen Canyon Dam
presents one of the more difficult and complex problems in public resource
management.  Decisions about the magnitude and timing of water releases
through the dam affect numerous resources and water uses.  The effects on
some resources and uses, such as water storage and hydroelectric power pro-
duction, are easily quantified, predicted, and measured.  Effects on other
resources, however, such as endangered native fish populations, non-native
sport fisheries, archaeological sites, and beaches used by recreationists in the
Grand Canyon, are complex and much harder to measure and have sometimes
proven unpredictable.
Like the resources affected by the dam, the laws affecting the operation of
Glen Canyon Dam are numerous and complex.  However, they are not
unfathomable.  These laws, considered together, create a hierarchy of legal pri-
orities among the resources and uses affected by the dam, and this legal hierar-
chy should constrain decisionmaking about dam operations.  At the top of the
hierarchy are (1) mandatory requirements for water storage and supply con-
tained in the Colorado River Compact, the Boulder Canyon Project Act, and
other laws specific to the Colorado River and (2) mandatory requirements for
endangered species conservation contained in the Endangered Species Act.
While it is unclear which of these two sets of requirements has a higher legal
priority, they are mutually compatible and are both superior to more discretion-
ary laws protecting and promoting other resources and uses, including hydroe-
lectric power production and non-native sport fisheries.
The Endangered Species Act appoints a scientific arbiter, the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, to make judgment calls regarding the dam’s effects on, and
the measures necessary to conserve, endangered species of fish and wildlife.
The Fish and Wildlife Service, in a Biological Opinion issued in 1994, identi-
fied certain modifications in dam operations that it deemed necessary for the
survival of the humpback chub, an endangered species of native fish whose
largest surviving population is in the Grand Canyon and a tributary canyon (the
Little Colorado) below the dam.  Fourteen years later, these changes have not
been implemented, and the United States Bureau of Reclamation continues to
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operate the dam in a manner that the Fish and Wildlife Service has determined
jeopardizes the continued existence of the chub.
Since 1996, the Bureau has operated the dam under a program of “adap-
tive management.”  At the heart of the Adaptive Management Program is a
committee of “stakeholders” that makes recommendations to the Secretary of
the Interior, who oversees the Bureau, concerning operations of the dam.  It is
the thesis of this Article that the Adaptive Management Program has facilitated
non-compliance with the Endangered Species Act by substituting the search for
consensus among stakeholders for the requirements of the Act.
Part II of this Article presents background information on the Colorado
River, Glen Canyon Dam, and the dam’s effects on the aquatic environment of
the Colorado River in the Grand Canyon and the fish therein, especially the
endangered humpback chub.  Part III explores the legal hierarchy of resources
and uses created by the laws affecting management of the dam.  Part IV traces
the recent history of operations of Glen Canyon Dam, with emphasis on the
Bureau’s non-compliance with the Endangered Species Act.  Part V considers
the reasons for the Bureau’s non-compliance and concludes that the Adaptive
Management Program has been a significant factor facilitating, if not causing,
that non-compliance.  Part VI identifies the attributes of the Adaptive Manage-
ment Program that have contributed to non-compliance and argues that one
such attribute, collaboration among stakeholders, has been unnecessarily
included in the program.  Finally, Part VII briefly outlines a proposal for adap-
tive, but not collaborative, management of Glen Canyon Dam that would be
consistent with the Endangered Species Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Colorado River Compact and Glen Canyon Dam
The drainage basin of the Colorado River includes portions of seven
states:  Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Califor-
nia.1  The Colorado River Compact of 1922 divided the basin into the “Upper
Basin” and the “Lower Basin,” with the dividing line between the Upper and
Lower Basins drawn at Lee Ferry, a point on the river about twenty miles south
of the Utah-Arizona border, just upstream of the Grand Canyon.2  Wyoming’s,
Colorado’s, Utah’s, and New Mexico’s portions of the Colorado River drainage
are entirely or mostly in the Upper Basin and these four states are known as the
“States of the Upper Division.”3  Nevada, Arizona, and California are the
“States of the Lower Division.”4
Under the terms of the Compact, each Basin was apportioned an annual
consumptive use of 7.5 million acre-feet of the river’s water.5  The Compact
also provided that “[t]he States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of
the river at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet
1 See Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. II, 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf.
2 Id. art. II(f)-(g).
3 Id. art. II(c).
4 Id. art. II(d).
5 Id. art. III(a).
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for any period of ten consecutive years.”6  The requirement to ensure decadal
flows of seventy-five million acre-feet to the Lower Basin, combined with
inevitable fluctuations in the river’s flow in response to weather patterns, meant
that the Upper Basin could not count on actually utilizing its allocation every
year.  Specifically, if a dry decade were to result in total runoff of only, say,
125 million acre-feet, then the requirement to allow seventy-five million acre-
feet to pass to the Lower Basin would leave only fifty million acre-feet, or an
average of five million acre-feet per year, for use in the Upper Basin during
that decade.
Glen Canyon Dam was designed to alleviate this potential constraint on
the Upper Basin’s use of Colorado River water.  Authorized by the Colorado
River Storage Project of 19567 and built by the Bureau of Reclamation between
1956 and 1963, the dam is in the Upper Basin, but just barely.  It’s in Arizona,
about fifteen miles upstream of Lee Ferry and about five miles downstream
from the Utah border.8  When full, the reservoir behind the dam, Lake Powell,
holds about twenty-seven million acre-feet of water,9 or nearly four years’
worth of the Upper Basin’s obligation to the Lower Basin under the Compact.
Lake Powell fills during wet periods and reduces the likelihood that, in a
dry period, water uses in the Upper Basin will have to be curtailed in order to
satisfy the Upper Basin’s commitment to the Lower Basin under the Compact.
While the lake is too low in the basin for its water to be used directly by farms,
cities, or industries in the Upper Basin, releases of water from the reservoir can
be used to meet the Compact’s requirement.
Glen Canyon Dam also produces hydroelectric power.  The dam’s eight
generators can produce a total of 1320 megawatts of power (enough to supply
the domestic consumption of about one million homes) at a maximum com-
bined flow rate of 33,200 cubic feet per second (“cfs”).10  Since the average
flow through the dam in recent years has been only about 11,000 cfs (eight
million acre-feet per year),11 on average the generators have been running at
only about one third of their capacity.  But the dam’s capacity to produce
“peaking power” of up to 1320 megawatts is an important asset on the western
power grid.  Unlike a coal-burning or nuclear power plant, whose output can be
changed only slowly, a hydroelectric plant can be turned up or down in a matter
of minutes simply by opening or closing valves to draw more or less water into
6 Id. art. III(d).
7 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620(o) (2000).
8 For a map of the vicinity of Glen Canyon Dam, see U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, USGS CIRCULAR 1282, THE STATE OF THE COLORADO RIVER ECOSYS-
TEM IN GRAND CANYON 3 (Stephen P. Gloss et al. eds., 2005), available at http://www.
gcmrc.gov/products/score/2005/pdf/score_2005.pdf [hereinafter SCORE REPORT].  The
SCORE Report is an extraordinarily valuable source of information on virtually all matters
related to Glen Canyon Dam and its operations.  This Article relies heavily on information
from the SCORE Report.
9 Id. at 2.
10 Id. at 166.
11 The minimum annual release from Glen Canyon Dam to meet compact requirements and
a treaty obligation to Mexico is 8.23 million acre-feet per year.  This was also the amount of
water actually released from the dam in each of the years 2001 through 2004. Id. at 171.
One million acre-feet per year equals approximately 1400 cfs.
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the turbines.  Thus, it can respond quickly to peaks in power demand caused by
either predictable events, such as the surge in air conditioning use on a summer
afternoon, or unpredictable events, such as the failure of a transmission line
bringing in power from another source.12
B. The Effects of Glen Canyon Dam on the Aquatic Environment of the
Grand Canyon
Because Glen Canyon Dam is immediately upstream of the Grand Can-
yon,13 virtually all water flowing in the canyon must first pass through the dam.
The existence and operation of the dam has profoundly altered the aquatic envi-
ronment of the canyon in three respects:  flow pattern, sediment content, and
temperature.
1. Flow Pattern
The quantity of water flowing in the Colorado River through the Grand
Canyon, before it was changed by Glen Canyon Dam, varied enormously from
season to season.  The flow peaked in the late spring and early summer as the
winter snows melted in the river’s Rocky Mountain headwaters.  The median
peak flow at that time of year was around 85,000 cfs, and flows exceeding
120,000 cfs occurred one year in six.14  The highest flow recorded in historic
times was around 200,000 cfs in 1884, and the flow reached 170,000 cfs in
1921.15  On the other hand, a typical flow in late summer, fall, or winter was
only about 3000 cfs.16
The construction and operation of the dam has largely eliminated the natu-
ral seasonal and annual variability in the river’s flow, for two reasons.  First, in
most years, the dam is not physically capable of releasing flows of the magni-
tude of the former annual peaks; the holes in the dam are too few and too small.
The dam’s electric generators can pass a maximum flow of about 33,000 cfs.17
Another 15,000 cfs can pass through a set of tubes called the river outlet works
and commonly know as the “jet tubes.”18  The combined total flow of about
48,000 cfs is little more than half of the typical pre-dam spring peak and only
around a quarter of the highest recorded flows.  The dam’s spillways can con-
vey much greater flows, up to 208,000 cfs,19 but the intakes to the spillways are
near the top of the dam and thus can operate only when Lake Powell is full or
12 See id. at 166-68.
13 Strictly speaking, the first fifteen river miles below the dam are in lower Glen Canyon,
followed by about sixty miles of Marble Canyon, and then over 200 miles of the Grand
Canyon, ending at Lake Mead.  The dividing point between Glen Canyon and Marble Can-
yon is Lee Ferry; the division between Marble Canyon and the Grand Canyon is the mouth
of the Little Colorado River. See id. at 3 (map), 11.  In this Article, as in the SCORE Report,
lower Glen Canyon, Marble Canyon, and the Grand Canyon proper, will be referred to col-
lectively as the Grand Canyon.
14 See id. at 2.
15 Id. at 184.
16 See id. at 2.
17 Id. at 70, 166.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 70.
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nearly so,20 a condition that has occurred only once, in 1983.21  Therefore, in
the majority of years, the most water that the dam can convey is 48,000 cfs.
Second, from the dam’s completion in 1963 until 1991, the intra-annual
pattern of dam releases was determined largely by the demand for electric
power.  Except for a period in the early 1980s when a full reservoir required
greater releases, flows through the dam were limited to the power plant capac-
ity of 33,000 cfs so as to avoid using the jet tubes, which generate no power.22
Moreover, taking advantage of the dam’s flexibility to provide peaking power,
from 1963 until 1991 the Bureau of Reclamation operated the dam on a daily
fluctuating cycle to match the demand for electric power.  In the afternoons,
when demand was highest, the generators were typically run near their capac-
ity.  At night, when demand was low, flows were reduced to less than 5000
cfs.23  These daily fluctuations caused the level of the river’s surface (known as
the “stage” elevation) in the Grand Canyon to rise and fall by seven to thirteen
feet each day.
During this period, there was also some seasonal variation in flow, but the
pattern was much less pronounced, and much different, than the natural pattern
of high flows in the late spring and early summer and low flows in the late
summer, fall, and winter.  Post-dam, higher flows have been conveyed in mid-
summer and mid-winter, when cooling and heating increases electric power
use, with lower flows in the fall and spring.24  Overall, the effect of the dam
and its operation has been to replace a regime of high seasonal variability and
relatively small daily variability with a regime of high daily variability and
minimal seasonal variability.
2. Sediment
Before the construction of Glen Canyon Dam, the Colorado River carried
an enormous sediment load through the Grand Canyon.  The turbid, muddy
river was famously characterized as “too thick to drink; too thin to plow.”  The
total amount of sand transported annually by the river through the canyon has
been estimated at twenty-five to thirty million tons.25
Because slow-moving water can suspend much less sediment than fast-
moving water, a river drops most of its sediment load to the bottom when it
enters the standing water of a lake or reservoir.  Since the completion of Glen
Canyon Dam in 1963, the vast majority of the sediment carried by the Colorado
River has been deposited in the upper reaches of Lake Powell.  The water pass-
ing through the dam is nearly clear.26  Tributaries entering the river below Glen
Canyon Dam, primarily the Paria River and the Little Colorado River, still
provide some sediment to the Grand Canyon, but the total sand supply is only
approximately 16% of the pre-dam supply.27
20 Id. at 166.
21 See id. at 20 fig.1.
22 See id.
23 Id. at 19.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 18.
26 See id.
27 Id.
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The drastic reduction in sand supply, along with the change in flow pat-
tern, has changed the physical environment in the Grand Canyon.  Beaches and
sand bars in the canyon, if they are to be maintained, need to be periodically
replenished with fresh sand to offset the constant loss of sand to erosion by
wind and water.  Before the construction of the dam, these beaches and sand
bars were replenished by the deposit of sand from the river during periods of
high flows in the spring and summer.28  The construction and operation of the
dam have eliminated most of the sand supply as well as the floods necessary to
raise that sand onto beaches and sandbars.  Now, the relatively clear water of
the river erodes sandbars and beaches but does not replenish them.  As a result,
sandbars and beaches in the canyon are shrinking.29
3. Temperature
Before the construction of the dam, the temperature of the water in the
Grand Canyon varied from near freezing in winter to around eighty degrees
Fahrenheit in summer, with a year-round average of around fifty-seven
degrees.30  Now, water enters the canyon via the generator turbines of Glen
Canyon Dam, which draw water from deep under the surface of Lake Powell.
The temperature of this water is subject to relatively little seasonal fluctuation
and is generally colder than the pre-dam average.  From 1973 to 2003, the
annual average temperature of water released from the dam was about forty-
nine degrees.31
C. Fish of the Grand Canyon
1. Native Fish
The unusual pre-dam aquatic environment of the Colorado River in the
Grand Canyon—extremely turbid water, with enormous seasonal variations in
temperature and flow—supported an equally unusual community of native fish.
Eight species of native fish were once found in the canyon:  five members of
the minnow family (humpback chub, bonytail chub, roundtail chub, Colorado
pikeminnow (formerly known as squawfish), and speckled dace) and three
members of the sucker family (bluehead sucker, flannelmouth sucker, and
razorback sucker).32  Six of these species are found nowhere else in the world
besides the Colorado River Basin.33  Unfortunately, of the canyon’s original
28 See id.
29 See id. at 21.  There is an offsetting effect.  Because the dam has reduced peak floods, it
has reduced the erosive power of the river.  If this effect reduced erosion more than the loss
of sediment reduced deposition, there could conceivably be an increase, rather than a
decrease, in the quantity of sediment found in the canyon.  But recent empirical studies have
revealed that this is not the case.  On balance, the changes wrought by the dam have led to a
steady loss of sediment from the canyon. See id.
30 Id. at 76.
31 Id. at 77.  In the period from 2003 to 2005, drought reduced the depth of Lake Powell,
and the average temperature of water released from the dam edged up into the upper fifties.
See id.
32 Id. at 34 tbl.1, 35.  The table also lists two other members of the minnow family, Virgin
spinedace and woundfin, but notes that these two species were found “almost exclusively” in
smaller tributaries of the Colorado rather than in the river itself.
33 Id. at 35.
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complement of eight fish species, four species (bonytail chub, roundtail chub,
Colorado pikeminnow, and razorback sucker) are no longer found there.34
Of the four species of native fish that retain a presence in the Grand Can-
yon, one, the humpback chub (Gila cypha), is on the federal list of endangered
species.35  Although a member of the minnow family, the humpback chub is a
medium-sized fish.  Adults reach about twenty inches in length36 and can live
for over twenty years.37
The humpback chub, like the other native fish of the Grand Canyon, is
considered a “warmwater” fish.  Although it can, and did, survive in the can-
yon’s cold water in winter, it requires seasonally warm water in which to spawn
and grow.  The canyon’s warm water in the summer and fall met the chub’s
needs for reproduction and growth.38
The humpback chub has become the principal focus of controversy and
litigation over management of Glen Canyon Dam for two reasons.  First, it is
the only endangered species of fish that currently resides in the Grand Canyon.
Second, unlike the three other species of native fish still found in the canyon
(speckled dace, bluehead sucker, and flannelmouth sucker), which have greater
populations elsewhere, the humpback chub’s largest remaining population is in
the Grand Canyon.39  The Grand Canyon population is also the only success-
fully reproducing population of humpback chub in the lower basin of the Colo-
rado River.40  Therefore, the fate of the Grand Canyon population is critical to
the survival of the species.
2. Introduced Fish
For many years, the native fish of the Grand Canyon have been over-
whelmed by far greater numbers of exotic (non-native) fish that have been
introduced into the canyon either deliberately, for recreational fishing, or acci-
dentally.  As with native fish, quantitative data about non-native fish popula-
tions are lacking before the 1980s, but it is known that non-native fish have
been present in the Grand Canyon since the nineteenth century.41  As with
native fish, the pre-dam aquatic environment in the Grand Canyon was most
hospitable to warmwater species of non-native fish, such as catfish, carp, bass,
and sunfish.  By the time Glen Canyon Dam was built in the mid-twentieth
34 Id. at 34 tbl.1, 35.
35 Id. at 35.  Of the four fish species that have been extirpated from the Grand Canyon, three
(bonytail chub, Colorado pikeminnow, and razorback sucker) are on the federal list of
endangered species.  Only the roundtail chub is sufficiently common elsewhere to have
avoided being listed, at least so far. See id. at 34 tbl.1.
36 Id. at 51.
37 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION:
OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM 8 (1994), available at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/
arizona/Documents/Biol_Opin/93167_GlenCanyonOperations.pdf [hereinafter 1994 BIO-
LOGICAL OPINION] .
38 SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 36.
39 1994 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 8.
40 Memorandum from Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Inte-
rior, to Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, Utah 9 (Dec. 6, 2002), available
at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/arizona/Documents/Biol_Opin/03016_Glen_Canyon_
Dam.pdf.
41 SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 36.
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century, one non-native warmwater species, channel catfish, was the most
abundant fish in the canyon.42
The cooling and clearing of the canyon’s waters brought about by the con-
struction of Glen Canyon Dam made the river less hospitable to warmwater
fish, but greatly improved conditions for introduced coldwater fish, particularly
rainbow and brown trout.  While trout had previously been stocked in cooler,
clearer, tributaries such as Bright Angel Creek,43 the dam transformed the
mainstem of the river into trout habitat.44  The fifteen-mile stretch of the river
between the dam and Lee Ferry has become a very popular fishery for rainbow
trout, and the trout fishery there is a significant asset to the recreational econ-
omy in the area.45
Altogether, there are about four times as many non-native fish species as
native species in the Grand Canyon.46  In the upper reaches of the canyon,
closest to the dam, rainbow and brown trout are the most abundant fish.
Warmwater species, including carp, catfish, bass, and sunfish, are still present,
but in smaller numbers, and are mostly found lower in the canyon, farther from
the dam, where conditions are somewhat more hospitable because the river’s
water is warmed a few degrees by the sun as it moves through the 200 miles of
the canyon.47
D. The Humpback Chub in the Grand Canyon
As noted above, because of its endangered status, and because its largest
extant population is in the Grand Canyon, the humpback chub has become the
focus of controversy and litigation over the management of Glen Canyon Dam
and the dam’s effects on the aquatic environment of the canyon.
1. Population Trend
Systematic monitoring of humpback chub populations in the Grand Can-
yon began in the 1980s, so historic populations and trends before that time are
largely unknown.  What is known is that, from 1989 through the first few years
of the twenty-first century, the adult population steadily declined, from
10,000–12,000 adult fish in 1989 to 3000–5000 in 2002.48  The decline was
characterized by an annual mortality of approximately 15%–20% of the adult
population and a lack of recruitment (spawning plus survival and growth) of
new young fish.49
There is some reason to believe that, in the last few years (2001–2005),
the population of humpback chub in the Grand Canyon may have stabilized,
though at a lower level than the previous population.  In this period, the adult
population appears to have held steady at about 5000 fish, and in the last two
years of the period (2003–2005), there has been some increase in the number of
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 36, 156.
45 See id. at 156, 161 tbl.1.
46 Id. at 36.
47 Id. at 40.
48 Id. at 45 fig.12.
49 Id.
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juvenile fish observed, suggesting that conditions for spawning and incubation
may have improved.50
2. Factors Affecting the Population
The factors adversely affecting the humpback chub population in the
Grand Canyon are numerous, complex, and not well understood.  Some, but not
all, of them are attributable to the construction and operation of Glen Canyon
Dam.
Among the factors not entirely attributable to the dam is the presence of
large numbers of non-native fish.  These non-native fish may negatively affect
the humpback chub population by preying on chub eggs and young chub, by
competing with chub for food, and by driving chub away from spawning and
rearing areas.51  As noted above, the presence of large numbers of non-native
warmwater fish in the Grand Canyon predates the dam, and the cool water
released from the dam is actually a detriment to non-native warmwater fish.
However, as also noted above, the dam has made the canyon hospitable to
coldwater non-native fish—rainbow and brown trout—whose large populations
are a threat to the chub.  Whether, on balance, the dam has increased or
decreased the threat to the chub population from non-native fish is a point of
debate.
Another factor negatively affecting the humpback chub population that is
not attributable to the dam is the presence of a parasite, the Asian tapeworm.
Accidentally introduced into the United States in the 1970s, the Asian tape-
worm was discovered in the Little Colorado River, a tributary that is the princi-
pal spawning area for humpback chub in the Grand Canyon, in 1990.52  By
2004, over 90% of humpback chub were infested.53  Asian tapeworm infesta-
tion can be fatal to a chub, but more often it causes reduced growth and poor
condition.54  Like warmwater fish, the Asian tapeworm cannot complete its life
cycle in the relatively cool water that Glen Canyon Dam releases into the
Grand Canyon.  It is therefore restricted to warmer tributaries such as the Little
Colorado.55  This limitation on its spread can be seen as a beneficial effect of
the dam from the standpoint of the chub.
On the other hand, the changes in the aquatic environment wrought by
Glen Canyon Dam are harmful to the chub in several ways.  First, as a
warmwater fish, the chub cannot spawn in the cool water released from the
dam.  Since the completion of the dam in 1963, spawning of humpback chub
has been largely limited to the Little Colorado River, a tributary whose waters
are substantially warmer than those in the mainstem.56  Moreover, available
evidence suggests that juvenile fish entering the mainstem after hatching in the
50 GCMRC – Research – Information on Humpback Chub, August 2006, http://www.
gcmrc.gov/research/humpback_chub/20060802.aspx.
51 See SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 42.
52 Id. at 37.
53 Id. at 46.
54 Id. at 37.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 42.
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Little Colorado do not do well.57  They experience a “thermal shock” when
they hit the cold mainstem water, which debilitates them and makes them espe-
cially vulnerable to predators.58
Even those that survive in the mainstem do not grow well in the cold
water.  They can grow to maturity only by abiding in areas of relatively shal-
low, slow-moving water where the sun can raise the water temperature substan-
tially higher than in the main channel.59  Such conditions are found only in
shallow, nearshore areas and in backwaters that are separated from the main
channel by sandbars.  Unfortunately, two of the other changes in the aquatic
environment wrought by the dam—the loss of sediment and the alteration of
the river’s natural flow pattern—have severely reduced the availability of such
rearing habitat.
As noted above, the removal of most of the river’s sediment by the dam
has resulted in ongoing erosion of sandbars and a consequent reduction or loss
of backwaters.  The relatively clear, sediment-free water also makes young
chub more visible and thus more vulnerable to predation.  Moreover, the daily
fluctuations in the level of the river induced by power plant operations are
detrimental to the stability of nearshore and backwater habitats.  When the river
rises and falls several feet each day, areas that are shallow at low water become
relatively deep during high water, and areas that are shallow at high water
become dry at low water.  Similarly, a relatively warm, sheltered backwater at
low water may be inundated by the colder, swifter main channel at high water,
and a backwater at high water may be left high and dry at low water.60  This
destabilization of backwaters and nearshore habitats may leave young chub
with little or no suitable habitat in which to survive and grow to adulthood once
they are swept from their birthplace in the Little Colorado into the mainstem of
the river.61
The extent to which each of these complex effects influences the popula-
tion of the humpback chub is difficult to measure and quantify.  Hence, one
cannot state with any degree of certainty that one or a subset of these factors is
principally responsible for the limited reproduction of humpback chub in the
Grand Canyon in the late twentieth century, or, conversely, that any single
action or set of actions to modify these factors would lead to recovery of the
species.  However, some of these factors are much more easily changed than
others, and it is natural and logical to focus on those factors that are most
readily subject to human control.
The most difficult factor to change would be the sediment supply.  Short
of decommissioning Glen Canyon Dam and draining Lake Powell, the only
way to restore the sediment supply to the Grand Canyon would be somehow to
transport millions of tons of sand each year from the periphery of the lake,
around the dam, and into the canyon.  While schemes have been envisioned to
do this, it would take many years and cost many billions of dollars to construct
57 Id.
58 Id. at 42-44.
59 1994 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 11, 27.
60 Id. at 26.
61 SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44.
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the transport system, and it would entail numerous, and potentially very seri-
ous, collateral environmental impacts.
Raising the temperature of the water in the Grand Canyon to facilitate
spawning and growth of humpback chub would be more feasible than restoring
the sediment content, but would still be a substantial engineering enterprise
involving modification of the dam.  A temperature control device would consist
of an intake structure on the upstream side of the dam that would draw water
from the higher, warmer levels of Lake Powell down into the intakes of the
electric generators.  Installation of such a device would cost about fifteen mil-
lion dollars, but would entail substantial risk because it would also make the
canyon more hospitable to the several species of non-native warmwater fish
that are abundant in the lower part of the Grand Canyon and downstream in
Lake Mead.
The easiest factor to modify is the flow pattern.  The daily fluctuations in
river flow through the Grand Canyon are caused by the opening and closing of
the valves that regulate the flow of water through the electric generators.  While
the economic and legal implications of operating the valves so as to reduce or
eliminate these fluctuations may (or may not, as will be discussed below) be
complex, there are no physical or technological impediments to doing so.
Steady flows through the dam have been implemented, for relatively short
times, in the past, and could be implemented again, either temporarily or per-
manently, at any time.
Because there are no technological barriers to modifying the seasonal and
daily pattern of water flows through the dam, there is no excuse for failure to
comply with the law in determining what the pattern will be.  For this reason,
the remainder of this Article, which is concerned with the application (or lack
thereof) of the law, will focus primarily on the issue of flow pattern.
III. THE LEGAL HIERARCHY OF WATER USES AND RESOURCES AFFECTED
BY THE OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM
The operation of Glen Canyon Dam affects numerous resources and water
uses, including, but not limited to, water supply for consumptive uses, hydroe-
lectric power production, endangered species of native fish, recreational
angling for non-native fish, and recreational boating in the Grand Canyon.
Choices about the operation of the dam involve trade-offs between these
resources and uses.  The trade-off between hydropower production and endan-
gered species protection is the primary focus of this Article.
Under the law, not all resources and uses affected by the dam are equal in
stature.  The several federal statutes affecting management of the dam create, in
effect, a hierarchy of resources and uses.  At the top of the hierarchy are water
storage and supply and endangered species, both of which enjoy the protection
of specific, mandatory legal requirements that are subject to no, or only very
narrow, exceptions.  The law also calls on the Bureau of Reclamation to oper-
ate the dam in a manner that advances or protects other resources and uses,
such as recreation and hydropower production, but only to the extent consistent
with the mandatory requirements for water supply and endangered species
protection.
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A. Water Storage and Supply
The Colorado River Compact of 1922, whose requirements provided the
primary impetus for the construction of Glen Canyon Dam, also constitutes the
primary charter for the dam’s operation.  Article III(d) of the Compact states
that “[t]he States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at
Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre-feet for any
period of ten consecutive years.”62  Thus, a baseline requirement for the dam’s
operation is that the Lower Basin should receive an annual average flow of at
least 7.5 million acre-feet.  An additional constraint is placed on the dam’s
operation by article III(c) of the Compact, which provides that, except in times
of surplus, the Upper Basin and Lower Basin shall contribute equally from their
shares to satisfy any obligation that the United States may incur to leave water
in the river for the benefit of Mexico.63  This obligation was quantified in 1944
by a treaty between the United States and Mexico, which allocated 1.5 million
acre-feet annually of the river’s water to Mexico.64
In the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968,65 Congress incorporated
these constraints in an ordered list of priorities for storage of water in, and
releases of water from, Lake Powell.  The list gives first priority to satisfaction
of the Mexican treaty obligation, second priority to satisfaction of the Upper
Basin’s obligation to the Lower Basin under Compact article III(d), and third
priority to maintaining a sufficient backup supply stored in Lake Powell to
ensure that the first two priorities can be met under reasonably anticipated
future climatic conditions.66  The list then specifies that, when there is addi-
tional water available for storage or release after these three priorities have
been satisfied, additional water may be released either for use in the Lower
Basin or to equalize the amount of water stored in Lake Powell and in Lake
Mead downstream.67
The 1968 Act instructed the Bureau of Reclamation to promulgate “crite-
ria” for dam operations to implement these priorities.68  In the criteria issued
pursuant to this requirement, the Bureau has set the “normal year” release from
the dam at 8.23 million acre-feet.  This figure was determined by adding the
Upper Basin’s one-half share (0.75 million acre-feet) of the Mexican treaty
obligation to the Compact’s requirement of an average flow of 7.5 million acre-
feet and then subtracting the average contribution of the Paria River (0.02 mil-
lion acre-feet), which enters the Colorado below Glen Canyon Dam but just
above the division point at Lee Ferry, and thus contributes to the flow from the
Upper Basin to the Lower Basin.
62 Colorado River Compact of 1922, art. III(d), 70 CONG. REC. 324 (1928).
63 Id. art. III(c).
64 Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande art. 10(a), U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, available at http://www.usbr.gov/
lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf.
65 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1556 (2000).  This is the statute that, among other things, authorized
construction of the Central Arizona Project to bring Colorado River water to Phoenix, Tuc-
son, and surrounding areas.
66 Id. § 1552(a).
67 Id. § 1552(a)(3).
68 Id. § 1552.
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Despite these seemingly precise instructions for releases from the dam,
significant controversy persists between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin
states regarding required annual releases.  The controversy stems from, among
other things, ambiguity in the meaning of the word “surplus,” which determines
when the Upper Basin must contribute to meeting the Mexican treaty obliga-
tion, and disagreement over the appropriateness of providing a minimum
annual release as opposed to the less demanding decadal average specified in
the Compact, which would allow for lesser releases in some years so long as
they are compensated by greater releases in preceding or following years.
For purposes of this Article, however, the most salient feature of the statu-
tory provisions governing operation of Glen Canyon Dam is that they govern
only annual and decadal releases of water from the dam, and they are indiffer-
ent to the intra-annual pattern of releases.  That is, any pattern of releases from
the dam—steady through the year, seasonally fluctuating, daily fluctuating, or a
combination—will satisfy the laws governing water storage and supply so long
as the correct total amount of water is released from the dam over the course of
each year and each decade.
Not only the law, but also water uses in the Lower Basin are indifferent to
the intra-annual pattern of releases from Glen Canyon Dam because such
releases do not flow directly to Lower Basin water users.  Rather, they flow
through the Grand Canyon into Lake Mead, behind Hoover Dam.  Lake Mead,
with a storage capacity roughly equal to that of Lake Powell, acts as a regulat-
ing buffer between Glen Canyon Dam and Lower Basin water users.  There-
fore, hourly, daily, and seasonal fluctuations in releases from Glen Canyon
Dam do not affect water uses in the Lower Basin.  As far as such uses are
concerned, only the total annual water release from the dam matters.69
B. Endangered Species
1. The Endangered Species Act
Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”) requires
every federal agency to ensure “that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or
adverse modification” of the designated critical habitat of the species.70  With
respect to dams, “action” within the meaning of this provision includes not only
the construction or modification of a dam but also the ongoing operation of a
dam.71  Therefore, the Bureau of Reclamation is required to operate Glen Can-
yon Dam in a manner that is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
the humpback chub.
69 See, e.g., Upper Colorado Region, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
Interior Secretary Kempthorne Launches Grand Canyon High Flow Experiment, http://
www.usbr.gov/uc/feature/GC-hfe/index.html (last visited May 20, 2008) [hereinafter High
Flow Experiment] (explaining that sixty-hour high flow experiment conducted in March
2008 would have no effect on the annual quantity of water flowing to Lake Mead and the
Lower Basin).
70 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
71 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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As it happened, the operation of another dam—the Tellico Dam on the
Little Tennessee River in Tennessee—gave the Supreme Court the occasion to
confirm the mandatory and uncompromising nature of section 7’s mandate.  In
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,72 the Court held that the operation of the
dam should be enjoined because it would inundate the last known habitat for a
species of small fish called the snail darter.  The court rejected arguments that
the dam should be allowed to operate because it was constructed before the
passage of the ESA, or that Congress had implicitly waived compliance with
the ESA by continuing to appropriate money for the dam’s operation after pas-
sage of the Act.  In hewing to a strict application of the Act, the Court wrote:
This language [section 7(a)(2)] admits of no exception. . . .  [E]xamination of the
language, history, and structure of the legislation under review here indicates beyond
doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of
priorities.73
More recently, the Supreme Court placed an important limitation on the
mandatory nature of section 7(a)(2).  In National Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife,74 the Court affirmed a Fish & Wildlife Service regula-
tion that stated that section 7(a)(2) applies only to “actions in which there is
discretionary Federal involvement or control.”75  Thus, an agency’s duty to
avoid jeopardy or adverse modification of critical habitat “does not attach to
actions . . . that an agency is required by statute to undertake once certain
specified triggering events have occurred.”76
The substantive mandate of section 7 is accompanied by a procedural
requirement that makes the United States Fish & Wildlife Service the arbiter of
whether a proposed agency action is or is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of a threatened or endangered species.  When another federal agency
proposes an action that is likely to affect a threatened or endangered species,
the Fish and Wildlife Service prepares a “Biological Opinion” evaluating
whether the action is likely to jeopardize the species or harm its critical
habitat.77  If the opinion concludes that jeopardy or adverse modification will
occur, in violation of section 7(a)(2), then the opinion can suggest “reasonable
and prudent alternatives” that would not violate section 7(a)(2).78
2. The Grand Canyon Protection Act
The ESA’s broad mandate for protection of endangered species is supple-
mented by another statute that applies explicitly to the operations of Glen Can-
yon Dam, the Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 (“GCPA”).79  Section
1802(a) of that Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to
72 Id. at 194-95.
73 Id. at 173-74.
74 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
75 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2006) (emphasis added).
76 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2536.
77 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000).
78 Id.
79 Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, 4669-73.
The Act was Title XVIII of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of
1992, Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600.
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operate Glen Canyon Dam in accordance with the additional criteria and operating
plans specified in section 1804 and exercise other authorities under existing law in
such a manner as to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for
which Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area were
established, including, but not limited to natural and cultural resources and visitor
use.80
Section 1804, in turn, requires the preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement (“EIS”) and an audit of the costs and benefits of dam operations, and
the adoption of criteria and plans for dam operations based on the findings of
the EIS and the audit.81  Section 1804 also reiterates that the criteria and plans,
as well as the exercise of other existing legal authorities, shall ensure that the
dam is operated in a manner consistent with the mandate of section 1802,
quoted above, to protect the values for which Grand Canyon National Park
(“GCNP”) and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area (“GCNRA”) were
established.82  Sections 1804(c)(3) and 1805(c) require the Secretary to consult
with the governors of the basin states, Native American tribes, academic and
scientific representatives, environmental organizations, the recreation industry,
electric power purchasers, and the public in the development of operating crite-
ria and plans for the dam and in monitoring and other activities to ensure that
the dam is operated in accordance with the Act.83
The values for which GCNP was established in 1919 are not explicitly
stated in the legislation that established the park, but they may be inferred from
the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 (“Organic Act”), which governs
management of the entire national park system, including both GCNP and
GCNRA.84  The Organic Act defines the “fundamental purpose” of national
parks to be “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life [sic] therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such
80 Id. § 1802(a).  Professor Robert Adler, in a very thoughtful article on the Colorado River,
has pointed to an “apparent direct contradiction” between the GCPA’s mandate for natural
resource protection and its simultaneous insistence that it does not modify the requirements
of the Colorado River Compact, the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956, or other
laws governing water supply and storage and hydroelectric power production on the Colo-
rado River. See Robert W. Adler, Restoring the Environment and Restoring Democracy:
Lessons from the Colorado River, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 86 (2007).  However, the apparent
contradiction can be at least partially resolved by the recognition, as noted above, see supra
text accompanying notes 68-69, that compliance with the laws governing water storage and
supply depends only on the total annual releases of water through Glen Canyon Dam, and is
unaffected by the seasonal and daily patterns or the temperature of those releases.  Thus, the
Bureau can, and under these laws must, manage the seasonal and daily patterns and the water
temperature in a manner to protect resources as required by the GCPA without violating
those other laws.  As for hydroelectric power production, as noted below, see infra text
accompanying note 96, the 1956 Act requires maximization of the quantity of power pro-
duced, but not the value of power produced.  Therefore, it does not mandate daily fluctuating
flows designed to provide peaking power.  The Bureau may, and under the GCPA must,
reduce or eliminate such fluctuations if and as necessary to protect natural resources.
81 Grand Canyon Protection Act § 1804.
82 Id. § 1804(c)(1)(B).
83 Id. §§ 1804(c)(3), 1805(c).
84 See 16 U.S.C. § 1c(a) (2000) (defining the “national park system” to include all lands
managed by the National Park Service).  Both Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Can-
yon National Recreation Area are managed by the National Park Service.
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manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.”85  The statute that established GCNRA stated that area’s
purpose to be to “provide for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of
Lake Powell and lands adjacent thereto in the States of Arizona and Utah and to
preserve scenic, scientific, and historic features contributing to public enjoy-
ment of the area.”86  Certainly native fish are “wild life” within the meaning of
the Organic Act, and they are arguably  “scientific . . . features contributing to
public enjoyment of the area” within the meaning of the GCNRA legislation.
Thus, they are among the values whose protection is mandated by the Grand
Canyon Protection Act of 1992.
Besides requiring that Glen Canyon Dam be operated so as to protect park
values, the Grand Canyon Protection Act also recognized that protection of
such values might entail the loss of some hydroelectric power production.  Sec-
tion 1809 of the Act instructs the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with
others, to “identify economically and technically feasible methods of replacing
any power generation that is lost through adoption of long-term operational
criteria for Glen Canyon Dam as required by Section 1804 of this title.”87
C. The Lack of Conflict Between Water Supply and the Humpback Chub
As a theoretical matter, the question of whether the Endangered Species
Act takes precedence over the Colorado River Compact, the Mexican treaty,
the Colorado River Basin Project Act, and other laws regulating the use of
Colorado River water presents an interesting and difficult legal question.88
However, as far as the operation of Glen Canyon Dam is concerned, that ques-
tion is hypothetical at this time because the measures identified by the Fish and
Wildlife Service as necessary for protection of the chub do not conflict with the
demands of water supply and storage.  These measures—elimination of the
daily fluctuations in releases and increasing the temperature of the water
released from the dam—would not affect the total amount of water released
over the course of a year.  And, as noted above, any measure that does not
affect the total amount of water released over the course of a year does not
affect Lower Basin water users and does not affect compliance with the laws
governing water use and storage.
On the other hand, measures to change daily release patterns and water
temperature are likely to affect other resources and uses, including non-native
sport fisheries and electric power production.  However, as will be discussed in
the following sections, these other resources and uses enjoy a lower level of
legal protection that is inferior to the mandatory requirements of the Endan-
gered Species Act.
85 Id. § 1.
86 Id. § 460dd(a).
87 Grand Canyon Protection Act § 1809.
88 The question would be whether the requirements of these laws are sufficiently mandatory
so as to preclude application of the Endangered Species Act or whether they leave some
discretion that could be exercised in favor of protection of endangered species. See Nat’l
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007); supra text accom-
panying notes 74-76.
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D. Hydroelectric Power Production
Although hydroelectric power production is one of the statutory purposes
of Glen Canyon Dam, it is lower in legal priority than either water storage and
supply or endangered species protection.  Section 1 of the Colorado River Stor-
age Project Act of 1956 (“CRSPA”), which authorized the construction of the
dam, defined hydroelectric power production as an incidental purpose of the
dam:
In order to initiate the comprehensive development of the water resources of the
Upper Colorado River Basin, for the purposes, among others, of regulating the flow
of the Colorado River, storing water for beneficial consumptive use, making it possi-
ble for the States of the Upper Basin to utilize, consistently with the provisions of the
Colorado River Compact, the apportionments made to and among them in the Colo-
rado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, respectively,
providing for the reclamation of arid and semiarid land, for the control of floods, and
for the generation of hydroelectric power, as an incident of the foregoing purposes,
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized (1) to construct, operate, and maintain
[Glen Canyon Dam and other dams].89
Section 7 of the CRSPA provides more specific direction regarding power
production:
The hydroelectric powerplants and transmission lines authorized by this chapter to be
constructed, operated, and maintained by the Secretary shall be operated in conjunc-
tion with other Federal powerplants, present and potential, so as to produce the great-
est practicable amount of power and energy that can be sold at firm power and
energy rates, but in the exercise of the authority hereby granted he shall not affect or
interfere with the operation of the provisions of the Colorado River Compact, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Boulder
Canyon Project Adjustment Act, and any contract lawfully entered into under said
Compacts and Acts.  Subject to the provisions of the Colorado River Compact,
neither the impounding nor the use of water for the generation of power and energy
at the plants of the Colorado River storage project shall preclude or impair the appro-
priation of water for domestic or agricultural purposes pursuant to applicable State
law.90
The strongest argument for giving a high priority to electric power produc-
tion is the requirement “to produce the greatest practicable amount of power
and energy that can be sold at firm power and energy rates,” but the succeeding
clauses clarify that this requirement is subservient to requirements for water
storage and supply.  And the term “practicable” implies some degree of discre-
tion, thus opening the door for application of the species protection mandate of
section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act.91
Moreover, even if the statutory instruction “to produce the greatest practi-
cable amount of power and energy that can be sold at firm power and energy
rates,” standing alone, were interpreted as leaving no discretion to sacrifice
power production for the sake of endangered species, that instruction has been
modified by the Grand Canyon Protection Act’s requirement to operate Glen
89 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2000) (emphasis added).
90 Id. § 620f (citations omitted).
91 See supra Part III.B.1.
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Canyon Dam so as to protect park values, which include fish.92  As noted
above, that Act explicitly contemplates the reduction of power production in
order to fulfill its resource protection mandate.93  And, under the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill,94 whenever an agency is statutorily permitted to tailor its
actions so as to protect endangered species, it must do so.  Therefore, under the
law, the maximization of electric power production at Glen Canyon Dam must
yield to protection of the humpback chub if necessary to avoid jeopardizing the
species.
Finally, it is worth noting that the adverse effects of hydroelectric power
production on the humpback chub and other native species are related not to the
total amount of power produced but rather to the daily fluctuations in flows
through the dam.95  These fluctuations result from the attempt to maximize the
value of the dam’s power production by concentrating that production at times
of peak demand.96  But maximizing the value of power production is not man-
dated by the CRSPA, which refers only to producing the greatest practicable
amount of power, or by any other statute.  Therefore, any such value maximiza-
tion is permissible, if at all, only if, and to the extent that, it does not jeopardize
the existence of the humpback chub or any other threatened or endangered
species.
E. Non-Native Fish
While the non-native sport fishery for rainbow trout at Lee Ferry is a sig-
nificant tourist attraction and a source of local income,97 it ranks low in the
legal hierarchy of protected resources.  Rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss),
which are native to the West Coast but not to the Colorado River, are a very
common species and are not listed as threatened or endangered.  Because the
population at Lee Ferry was developed after the completion of Glen Canyon
Dam in 1963, it would be difficult to argue that it is among “the values for
which Grand Canyon National Park [was] established” within the meaning of
the Grand Canyon Protection Act since Grand Canyon National Park was
established in 1919.  Moreover, the National Park Service (“NPS”) has gener-
ally interpreted its statutory mandate to protect wildlife in the National Parks98
as referring to native, not introduced species, and current NPS policy disfavors
the maintenance of populations of non-native species within the parks, espe-
cially where non-native species may pose a threat to native species, as rainbow
trout do to humpback chub.99
Recreational fishing for rainbow trout fits more plausibly within one of the
purposes for which Glen Canyon National Recreation Area was established in
1972, namely, “public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of Lake Powell
92 See supra Part III.B.2.
93 See supra text accompanying note 87.
94 See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
95 See supra text accompanying note 61.
96 See supra text accompanying note 23.
97 See supra text accompanying note 45.
98 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
99 See supra text accompanying note 51.
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and lands adjacent thereto.”  But the GCPA’s broad instruction to “protect, mit-
igate adverse impacts to, and improve” an assortment of values that includes
public outdoor recreation is not the kind of specific instruction for protection of
rainbow trout that can compete with the Endangered Species Act’s specific
mandate to avoid jeopardy to the humpback chub, or the Colorado River Com-
pact’s allocation of water between the Upper Basin and the Lower Basin.  If
and when maintenance of the rainbow trout fishery conflicts with endangered
species protection or water storage and supply, the trout must yield.
IV. THE RECENT HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF GLEN
CANYON DAM
The history of the administration and operation of Glen Canyon Dam is
long and tortured and cannot be fully recounted here.  We pick up the story in
1991, when the Bureau of Reclamation first implemented changes in dam oper-
ations for the sake of endangered species.100
A. 1991–1996:  Interim Operating Criteria
Fully thirty years ago, in 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued its
first Biological Opinion on the operation of Glen Canyon Dam.  That opinion
concluded that dam operations jeopardized the continued existence of the
humpback chub, but it did not require any immediate changes in those opera-
tions, only further study.101  It was not until 1991 that the Bureau responded
with any changes in dam operations.  In 1991, the Bureau issued “interim oper-
ating criteria” that restricted the degree of daily fluctuation in flow through the
dam.  In contrast to previous operations, in which flows often fluctuated by
more than 25,000 cfs each day (from less than 5000 cfs at night to more than
30,000 cfs during the afternoon), the interim operating criteria limited the
degree of daily fluctuation to either 5000, 6000, or 8000 cfs, depending on the
total monthly release volume.102
B. The 1994–1995 EIS
After passage of the Grand Canyon Protection Act,103 and pursuant to the
Act’s mandate, the Bureau of Reclamation prepared an Environmental Impact
Statement104 that analyzed nine different alternative scenarios105 for future
operations of Glen Canyon Dam.  A draft EIS was issued for public comment
in January 1994106 and the final EIS was released in March 1995.107
100 For information on the pre-1991 history of the dam’s administration, see 1994 BIOLOGI-
CAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 3-4.
101 See id. at 3 (discussing the 1978 opinion).
102 SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 19.
103 See supra Part III.B.2.
104 U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OPERATION OF GLEN
CANYON DAM:  FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1995), available at http://
www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/eis/gc/gcdOpsFEIS.html [hereinafter GLEN CANYON DAM
EIS].
105 See id. at 15-44.
106 See Notice of Availability and Notice of Public Hearings on the Draft Environmental
Impact Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 7, 1994).
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1. Alternative Flow Regimes
The principal difference distinguishing the alternatives in the EIS from
each other was in the degree of daily fluctuation in water flows to be permitted.
Permitting large fluctuations would take maximum advantage of the dam’s
ability to supply peaking power,108 but would be harmful to fish and other
resources in the Grand Canyon.  Thus, the different alternatives analyzed in the
EIS represented different potential levels of trade-off between power produc-
tion and resource protection.  The alternatives analyzed varied from the “No
Action” alternative,109 which would have perpetuated the 1963–1991 opera-
tions under which flows often varied by more than 25,000 cfs each day, to the
“Year-Round Steady Flow” alternative, which, as its name suggests, would
have required a steady flow of water through the dam throughout the year.110
Intermediate alternatives included several that would have allowed some daily
fluctuation but restricted the magnitude of the fluctuation,111 and a “Seasonally
Adjusted Steady Flow” (“SASF”) alternative that would have eliminated daily
fluctuations but allowed flow through the dam to vary seasonally, with the
highest flows (18,000 cfs) in May and June and the lowest flows (8000 cfs) in
October, November, and December.112  This alternative, which was designed to
protect and enhance native fish populations, would have mimicked, to a limited
degree, the natural seasonal flow pattern that prevailed before the dam was
built.
The 1995 EIS identified as the Bureau’s preferred alternative the “Modi-
fied Low Fluctuating Flow” (“MLFF”) alternative, which was similar to the
interim operating criteria under which the dam had been operating since
1991.113  Under this alternative, two important constraints would be placed on
the degree of daily fluctuation in flows through the dam.  First, the flow would
not be permitted to drop below 5000 cfs at night or below 8000 cfs during the
day, nor to exceed 25,000 cfs (about 25% below the power plant capacity of
33,000 cfs) at any time.114  Second, and most important, the difference between
the maximum and minimum flow in any one day would not be permitted to
exceed 5,000–8,000 cfs, the exact limit depending on the total monthly release
volume from the dam.115  This constraint, which was essentially the same as
that imposed by the interim operating criteria, was a substantial reduction in
fluctuation compared to the 25,000+ cfs variation permitted before 1991 and
analyzed under the No Action alternative.  Nonetheless, the daily flow fluctua-
107 See Notice of Availability of the Final Environmental Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg.
15,581 (Mar. 24, 1995).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 10-12, 22-23.
109 GLEN CANYON DAM EIS, supra note 104, at 19-23.
110 Id. at 33.
111 Id. at 24-30.
112 Id. at 32-33.
113 Id. at 27-29.
114 Id. at 28.  An exception was made to the 25,000 cfs limit for emergencies and for “high
inflow and storage conditions,” i.e., when Lake Powell is full and high releases are required
to avoid overtopping the dam. Id.
115 Id.
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tion permitted by the MLFF alternative would still cause the level of the river
to rise and fall by about three feet each day.116
2. Beach/Habitat-Building Flows
In addition to various limitations on daily fluctuations in dam releases,
most of the alternatives analyzed in the 1995 EIS, including the MLFF alterna-
tive, included provisions for occasional “Beach/Habitat-Building Flows”
(“BHBFs”) and “habitat maintenance flows.”  BHBFs, sometimes called “con-
trolled floods,” are releases of up to 45,000 cfs for one to two weeks at a time
for the purpose of rebuilding sandbars, depositing nutrients, restoring backwa-
ter channels, and “provid[ing] some of the dynamics of a natural system.”117
Because 45,000 cfs exceeds the capacity of Glen Canyon Dam’s hydroelectric
generators, BHBFs require the passing of water through the river outlet works,
also called the “jet tubes.”118  Habitat maintenance flows are also high flow
events for the same general purpose, but they are within the powerplant capac-
ity of 33,000 cfs.119
C. The 1994 Biological Opinion
Pursuant to section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service prepared a Biological Opinion (“BO”) on the effects of Glen
Canyon Dam’s operation on five endangered species:  humpback chub, razor-
back sucker, bald eagle, peregrine falcon, and Kanab ambersnail.120  The BO
took the Bureau of Reclamation’s MLFF alternative as described in the January
1994 draft EIS as the Bureau’s proposed action.121 The BO was issued in
December 1994, just before the Bureau issued its final EIS.
1. Jeopardy Determination
The BO concluded that operation of the dam under the MLFF alternative
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the bald eagle, peregrine fal-
con, or Kanab ambersnail, but it would jeopardize the continued existence, and
it would adversely modify or destroy critical habitat, of both the razorback
sucker and the humpback chub.122
In finding that the MLFF alternative would jeopardize the razorback
sucker and the humpback chub, the BO noted that much was still unknown
about the effects of dam operations on native fish, but it discussed numerous
116 See 1994 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 23-24 (noting daily fluctuation in river
stage of 0.8 to 1 meter under the MLFF alternative).
117 GLEN CANYON DAM EIS, supra note 104, at 40.  Despite the name “controlled flood,”
the BHBF flow rate of 45,000 cfs is quite modest compared to the natural annual, pre-dam
spring flows, which often exceeded 100,000 cfs. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
The current physical structure of the dam does not usually allow releases greater than about
48,000 cfs. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.  Thus, the choice of 45,000 cfs as a
BHBF flow rate reflects the physical limitations of the dam as much as a deliberate choice.
118 See supra text accompanying note 18.
119 See SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
120 1994 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 3.
121 Id. at 1.
122 Id. at 3.
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ways, some beneficial and some harmful, in which dam operations under that
alternative would likely affect these fish.  On the positive side, as compared to
the No Action alternative, the BO found that the MLFF alternative would bene-
fit the chub and the razorback sucker by increasing minimum flows, decreasing
maximum flows, and reducing the magnitude of daily flow fluctuations.  How-
ever, according to the BO, the MLFF alternative did not go far enough in the
direction of steadying flows.  The three-foot daily fluctuation in river level per-
mitted by the MLFF alternative would still be enough to eliminate most of the
backwater habitat needed by the chub.123  Moreover, the MLFF alternative
would do nothing to alleviate two other effects of the dam, namely, the year-
round maintenance of water temperatures too cold for spawning and for healthy
growth and development of young fish, and the loss of the sediment needed to
maintain beaches and sandbars.
According to the BO, as a result of these three factors—continuing
(though reduced) daily flow fluctuations, continued lack of sediment, and con-
tinued cold water in the mainstem of the Colorado—spawning and recruitment
of young humpback chub would continue to be largely precluded in the main-
stem and confined to the warmer, more sediment-laden tributary waters of the
Little Colorado River.  And with the chub population so dependent on a single,
relatively small stream, it is unacceptably vulnerable to decimation by water
pollution, a chemical spill, or some other catastrophic event or chronic condi-
tion.124  Therefore, the BO concluded, operation of Glen Canyon Dam under
the Bureau’s preferred alternative, MLFF, would jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of the humpback chub, as well as the razorback sucker, in violation of
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.125
2. Reasonable and Prudent Alternative
Pursuant to section 7(b)(3)(A) of the Endangered Species Act,126 the BO
described a “reasonable and prudent alternative” (“RPA”) under which, in the
judgment of the Fish & Wildlife Service, Glen Canyon Dam could be operated
without jeopardy to the humpback chub or the razorback sucker.127  The RPA’s
prescription for dam operations differed from the MLFF alternative in two sig-
nificant respects.  First, the RPA called on the Bureau to carry out a program of
experimental flows “to include high steady flows in the spring and low steady
flows in summer and fall during low water years.”128  “Steady flows” were
described as “a flow pattern that resembles the natural hydrograph, as described
for those seasons in the SASF [the Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flow alternative
described in the EIS129].”130  “Low water years” were defined to mean years in
which the total annual release of water through the dam is equal to the mini-
123 Id. at 23-24.
124 Id. at 20-21, 32.
125 Id. at 3.
126 43 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2000); see supra text accompanying note 78.
127 1994 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 33-39.
128 Id. at 35.
129 See supra text accompanying note 112.
130 1994 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 35.
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mum 8.23 million acre-feet needed to meet the Upper Basin’s obligations to the
Lower Basin and Mexico.131
The RPA called for the experimental steady flows to begin within three
years:
Design of the experimental flows and associated studies will begin as soon as
possible and be targeted for completion by October 1996.  Unless the [Fish & Wild-
life] Service determines information provided seriously questions the validity of
experimental designs developed or contribution of the resulting data to remove jeop-
ardy to the federally-listed aquatic fauna of the Grand Canyon, experimental flows
will be initiated in April 1997.  If sufficient progress and good faith effort is occur-
ring towards initiating experimental flows, implementation of experimental flows
may occur later in 1997.132
The RPA also contained a “hammer” clause requiring adoption of the SASF
alternative for seven months of each year if the Bureau of Reclamation did not
move quickly enough to implement the experimental steady flows:  “If the Ser-
vice believes there is not sufficient progress, Glen Canyon Dam would be oper-
ated as SASF flows during spring through fall (April to October) beginning in
1998.”133  In effect, the Fish and Wildlife Service was giving the Bureau a
choice for complying with the Endangered Species Act:  either promptly imple-
ment steady flows on an experimental, part-time basis, or implement them for
seven months a year.  Under the RPA, continued fluctuating flows without sub-
stantial periods of steady flow were not an option.
The second substantive change in dam operations required by the RPA
was that the Bureau was instructed to implement a “selective withdrawal pro-
gram” to increase the temperature of the water flowing from Glen Canyon Dam
into the Grand Canyon in order to make the river there more hospitable to
spawning and growth of humpback chub.134  A selective withdrawal program
would involve modifying the dam by adding a temperature control device
(“TCD”) on the upstream side.  The TCD would direct water from the higher,
warmer levels of Lake Powell into the dam’s hydroelectric generators.135
D. The Bureau of Reclamation’s Response to the 1994 Biological Opinion
On April 6, 1995, the Bureau of Reclamation sent a memorandum to the
Fish & Wildlife Service responding to the Service’s 1994 Biological Opinion,
including the RPA.136  The memorandum expressed a mix of grudging submis-
sion, skepticism, and defiance.  The memorandum began by stating that “[i]t is
our intent to implement the elements of the Reasonable and Prudent Alternative
131 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 68.
132 1994 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 37, at 35.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 36-37.
135 See UPPER COLO. REGION, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, GLEN CANYON DAM MODIFICATIONS TO CONTROL DOWNSTREAM TEMPERATURES:
PLAN AND DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (1999), available at http://www.usbr.gov/
uc/envprog/environment/pdfs/gcdtc.pdf.
136 Memorandum from Charles A. Calhoun, Reg’l Dir., Upper Colo. Reg’l Office, U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dept of the Interior, to Reg’l Dir., Region 2, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dept of the Interior (Apr. 6, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter
BuRec Response to RPA].
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(RPA)”137 but then went on to challenge the legal basis for the Service’s deter-
mination that the Bureau’s preferred MLFF alternative would jeopardize the
continued existence of the humpback chub.138  Of course, the raison d’etre for
the RPA was the Service’s determination that the MLFF alternative would
jeopardize the chub and adversely modify its critical habitat.139  Absent the
jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, the Bureau would be under
no legal compunction to follow the RPA.  But the Bureau’s memorandum indi-
cated that the Bureau, in recognition of its broader responsibility to utilize its
resources in furtherance of the purposes of the ESA,140 would implement the
RPA despite its view that the Service’s jeopardy determination was
unjustified.141
However, in its discussion of the several specific elements of the RPA, the
Bureau strongly hinted that it did not intend to implement the RPA’s require-
ment for steady flows in the prompt manner that the RPA required and that it
might not implement that requirement at all.  The memorandum implied that
the RPA did not describe the steady flow requirement with sufficient specificity
and expressed doubt as to whether this requirement met the regulatory defini-
tion of an RPA.142  It also treated steady flows as a risky experiment that
should not be undertaken without great caution and thorough preparation.143
(This rhetoric, which turned reality on its head by implying that turning the
river up and down on a daily basis to enhance power revenues was the safe,
conservative course of action, was a tactic that the Bureau would employ
repeatedly as it resisted implementation of steady flows over the next decade.)
It concluded that “it will be difficult at best to implement the flows within the
period of time recommended by the [Fish & Wildlife] Service.”144
E. The 1996 Record of Decision
1. Adoption of the MLFF Alternative
In October 1996, seventeen months after informing the Fish & Wildlife
Service that it intended to implement the RPA in the Service’s 1994 Biological
Opinion, the Bureau of Reclamation issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) gov-
erning future operations of Glen Canyon Dam.145  The ROD adopted the MLFF
alternative, the preferred alternative described in the EIS and determined by the
Fish & Wildlife Service to violate section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.146
137 Id. at 1.
138 Id. at 1-3.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78 (setting forth ESA’s connection between jeop-
ardy determinations and RPAs).
140 BuRec Response to RPA, supra note 136, at 3; see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (2000).
141 BuRec Response to RPA, supra note 136, at 3, 8.
142 Id. at 4; see 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2006) (defining “reasonable and prudent alternatives”).
143 BuRec Response to RPA, supra note 136, at 4.
144 Id.
145 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1996) [hereinafter 1996 RECORD OF DECISION]
available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_ROD.pdf.
146 Id. at 3.  The ROD made one minor modification to the MLFF alternative, regarding the
timing of Beach/Habitat-Building Flows.  Id.
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2. Adaptive Management
The ROD also initiated an Adaptive Management Program, which had
been described in the EIS.  The AMP called for monitoring the effects of dam
operations on downstream resources, including endangered fish, and modifying
those operations if the MLFF alternative were not successful in achieving the
desired results:
It is intended that the [Bureau’s decision] will initiate a process of “adaptive manage-
ment,” whereby the effects of dam operations on downstream resources would be
assessed and the results of those resource assessments would form the basis for future
modifications of dam operations.  Many uncertainties still exist regarding the down-
stream impacts of water releases from Glen Canyon Dam.  The concept of adaptive
management is based on the recognized need for operational flexibility to respond to
future monitoring and research findings and varying resource conditions.
The Adaptive Management Program (AMP) was developed and designed to provide
an organization and process for cooperative integration of dam operations, resource
protection and management, and monitoring and research information.147
While the AMP was defined in terms of monitoring, research, and flexible
management, the structure of the AMP described in the EIS introduced another
concept, namely, collaboration among stakeholders.  The heart of the AMP, as
described in the EIS, is the Adaptive Management Work Group (“AMWG”), an
advisory committee appointed by the Secretary of the Interior.  Membership of
the AMWG comprises representatives of federal agencies, each of the Colorado
River Basin states, environmental groups, recreational interests, and the electric
power industry.  The AMWG’s responsibilities include “[p]rovid[ing] the
framework for AMP policy, goals, and direction,” making recommendations to
the Secretary regarding possible decisions to modify dam operations, and
ensuring that any such decisions are incorporated into operating plans and
ongoing activities.148
According to the ROD, the Bureau intended to rely heavily on the AMWG
to ensure that future dam operations protected downstream resources as
required by the Endangered Species Act, the Grand Canyon Protection Act, and
other laws.  The ROD stated that, should the impacts of the flows and fluctua-
tions permitted by the selected MLFF alternative differ from the predictions of
the EIS, the AMWG would make recommendations to the Secretary to modify
those parameters.149  It also assigned to the AMWG the responsibility to rec-
ommend the timing, duration, and magnitude of the Beach/Habitat-Building
Flows designed to rebuild beaches and sandbars and restore backwater
habitats.150
3. The ROD’s Treatment of the Fish & Wildlife Service’s Biological
Opinion
Despite the Bureau’s having informed the Fish & Wildlife Service that it
intended to implement the RPA prescribed in the Service’s 1994 Biological
147 GLEN CANYON DAM EIS, supra note 104, at 34.
148 Id. at 36.
149 1996 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 145, at 3-4.
150 Id. at 10; see supra Part IV.B.2.
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Opinion, the ROD barely mentioned the BO.  The ROD did not reveal that the
Fish and Wildlife Service had determined that the alternative the Bureau was
adopting (MLFF) would violate the Endangered Species Act.  Nor did the ROD
describe, let alone adopt, the RPA, with its requirement for a program of steady
high flows in the spring and steady low flows in the summer and fall in low-
water years.
The ROD’s lone mention of the BO was in a section in which the Bureau
responded to public comments that it received after publication of the final EIS:
COMMENT:  Endorse the Fish & Wildlife Service’s Biological Opinion and imple-
ment experimental steady flows to benefit native fishes, subject to the results of a
risk/benefit analysis now in progress.
RESPONSE:  The preferred alternative provides for experimental steady flows
through the Adaptive Management Program for the reasons put forth in the Biologi-
cal Opinion.151
This response, which does not claim that the Bureau will actually follow
the prescription of the RPA, is confusing and somewhat misleading.  The only
arguably “steady” flows that the preferred alternative (MLFF) provided for
were the Beach/Habitat-Building Flows, which were high flows of one to two
weeks duration to be conducted for the purpose of rebuilding sandbars and
restoring backwater channels.152  Such one to two week flows would not meet
the RPA’s definition of “steady flows,” which was “a flow pattern that resem-
bles the natural hydrograph, as described for those seasons in the SASF [the
Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flow alternative described in the EIS].”153  A flow
pattern consisting of daily fluctuating flows interrupted by one to two weeks of
steady flows does not resemble the natural hydrograph and is not what was
described in the SASF alternative.  And even if the high flows of BHBFs were
considered “steady flows” within the meaning of the RPA, they do not even
arguably satisfy the RPA’s requirement for low steady flows in the summer and
fall, as well as high steady flows in the spring, in low water years.154
Moreover, the statement that “[t]he preferred alternative provides for
experimental steady flows through the Adaptive Management Program” indi-
cated that such flows would not be built into the operating plan put in place by
the ROD but rather would be part of the “future modifications of dam opera-
tions” that the AMP might (or might not) generate “to respond to future moni-
toring and research findings and varying resource conditions.”155
F. 1996–2002:  Operations Under the MLFF Alternative
With the issuance of the Bureau’s Record of Decision in 1996, the MLFF
Alternative, with its restrictions on daily flow fluctuations (which were similar
to those that had been imposed by the interim operating criteria since 1991) and
its requirements for occasional high flows to build and maintain habitat, but
without any provision for the low steady flows in summer and fall in low water
151 1996 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 145, at 8-9.
152 See supra Part IV.B.2.
153 See supra text accompanying note 130.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 147, 151.
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years required by the Fish & Wildlife Service’s RPA, became the official pre-
scription for future operations of Glen Canyon Dam.  In March 1996, to great
fanfare, the Bureau conducted the first Beach/Habitat-Building Flow, or “con-
trolled flood.”156  Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt traveled to Glen Can-
yon Dam so that he could personally open the valves to release 45,000 cfs of
water through the Grand Canyon for a period of one week.157  He declared that
the deliberate release of extra water from the dam for ecological purposes
marked the beginning of “a new era for ecosystems, a new era for dam manage-
ment, not only for the Colorado but for every river system and every watershed
in the United States.”158  Subsequently, the Bureau implemented a short habitat
maintenance flow (a high flow within the power plant capacity of 33,000
cfs159) for two days in November 1997.160
The Bureau, in memoranda to the Fish & Wildlife Service, cited these
high flows as evidence of partial compliance with the RPA’s requirement161 for
“high steady flows in the spring and low steady flows in summer and fall dur-
ing low water years” to enhance and maintain fish habitat.162  The Fish &
Wildlife Service, however, concluded that the Bureau was not making suffi-
cient progress to comply with the RPA:
This element [steady flows] has not seen sufficient progress.  Other than the con-
trolled BHBF in 1996, there have been minimum efforts to develop experimental
flows for native fishes.  The 1997 Fall Maintenance Flow and canceled 1998 BHBF
were designed to protect sediment resources.  Although there was some expectation
that backwaters and other nearshore habitats could be rejuvenated by these flows, this
was not the purpose of the flows.163
Moreover, in an earlier memorandum the Fish & Wildlife Service had empha-
sized that BHBFs and habitat maintenance flows alone could never satisfy the
requirements of the RPA because the RPA required not only periods of high
steady flows but also periods of low steady flows in the summer and fall to
provide conditions for rearing and growth of young chub:
The December 1994 Biological Opinion called for a program of experimental flows
to include high steady flows in the spring and low steady flows in summer and
156 See supra Part IV.B.2.
157 See Larry Warren, Stirring Things up on the Colorado River, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Apr. 15, 1996, http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article_id=1772# (describing the
flow as a “roaring success” of a media event).
158 Artificial Flood Created to Rejuvenate the Grand Canyon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996,
at B8.
159 See supra text accompanying note 119.
160 SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8, 14.
161 See supra text accompanying note 128.
162 Memoranda from Charles A. Calhoun, Reg’l Dir., Upper Colo. Reg’l Office, U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Phoenix, Ariz. (Nov. 27, 1996, and Dec. 12, 1997) (on file with author).  The term
“sufficient progress” was apparently taken from the RPA itself, which required that the
Bureau implement Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flows “[i]f the Service believes there is not
sufficient progress” in implementing the program of experimental steady flows prescribed in
the RPA. See supra text accompanying note 133.
163 Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
to Reg’l Dir., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Salt Lake City, Utah 3 (May 27, 1999) (on file
with author).
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fall. . . .  Although the Service supported the beach/habitat maintenance flow as a
means of reforming backwater channel habitats which could be used by native fishes,
the dismissal of the low steady flows in summer and fall indicates only partial pro-
gress toward meeting the intent of this element of the RPA. . . .  The Service is not
aware of progress towards designing a program of experimental flows which will
include high steady flows in the spring and low steady flows in the summer and
fall.164
Subsequently, in 2000, the Bureau conducted two additional four-day
habitat maintenance flows and a single period of low (8000 cfs) steady flow for
three months in the summer.165  But these very short high flows and a single
period of low flow fell far short of the program of steady flows required by the
RPA, and the Fish & Wildlife Service concluded again in 2002 that the Bureau
was not complying with the RPA:
This element steady [flows] has not seen sufficient progress. . . .  [G]iven the docu-
mented decline of the humpback chub in the Grand Canyon, additional delays in
developing a program of experimental flows for native fish should not occur. . . .
While we support the upcoming [high] flows for sediment conservation and acknowl-
edge the need for flows to disadvantage non-native species, these flows do not meet
the objective of this portion of the Reasonable and Prudent Alternative.  The program
for experimental flows, as required in the biological opinion, should include high
steady flows in the spring and low steady flows in summer and fall.166
G. 2002–2007:  Failure of the MLFF Alternative and New Experiments
By 2002, it had become apparent that operation of Glen Canyon Dam
according to the MLFF Alternative since 1996 (and the similar interim flow
regime from 1991 to 1996) had failed to achieve two major goals.  First, the
Beach/Habitat-Building Flows had not succeeded in maintaining or restoring
sandbars and beaches in the Grand Canyon.  Rather, these areas continued to
erode.167  Second, the population of humpback chub in the Grand Canyon and
its tributary, the Little Colorado River, had not stabilized or increased; rather it
was continuing to decline, while non-native fish populations, particularly rain-
bow trout, had increased.168  The dire situation was bluntly described by the
Bureau in 2002:
Since 1996, the non-native trout population in the Grand Canyon has tripled, the
endangered humpback chub (HBC) population has declined precipitously, and tribu-
tary sediment inputs are not being conserved as expected in the FEIS [1995 Final
Environmental Impact Statement].  These trends are contrary to the expectations of
the FEIS and the goals of the adaptive management program.  If no actions are taken
and current operations continue, these trends are expected to continue.169
164 Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ariz. Ecological Servs. Field Office, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Reg’l Dir., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Salt
Lake City, Utah 2 (Apr. 3, 1997) (on file with author).
165 See SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8, 198.
166 Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ariz. Ecological Servs. Field Office, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Reg’l Dir., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Salt
Lake City, Utah 3 (June 13, 2002) (on file with author).
167 See SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 22-25, 209 tbl.1.
168 See id. at 208, 210 tbl.1.
169 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED EXPERIMENTAL
RELEASES FROM GLEN CANYON DAM AND REMOVAL OF NON-NATIVE FISH, ENVIRONMENTAL
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In response to these failures, however, the Bureau did not finally acqui-
esce in the Fish & Wildlife Service’s mandate that it implement Seasonally
Adjusted Steady Flows in the spring, summer, and fall in order to maintain
better habitat for the humpback chub.170  Instead, working through the Adap-
tive Management Program established under the 1996 Record of Decision, the
Bureau modified the dam’s operations in two ways.  First, it made future
BHBFs contingent on, and required that they be timed to take advantage of,
significant inputs of sediment into the Colorado by floods from its tributary, the
Paria, at Lee Ferry.171  The idea behind this change was that the high flow of a
BHBF can be effective at restoring beaches and sandbars if and only if it occurs
at a time when there is sufficient sand available in the river bottom for the flood
to lift onto the beaches and sandbars.  And data collected and analyses per-
formed since 1996 indicated that sufficient sand was present in the river bottom
only for a limited time following a large input from a flood on the Paria before
it was swept downstream into Lake Mead.172  The new plan for BHBFs was
designed to fit them within this window of opportunity.  A BHBF under the
new plan was conducted in November 2004.173
Second, the Bureau created a new type of experimental flow, “the non-
native fish suppression flow.”  This type of flow, which is suspiciously (to this
author) similar to the highly fluctuating flows permitted before 1991, involves
ramping the river up and down from a minimum flow of 5000 cfs to a maxi-
mum of 20,000 cfs every day for three months during the winter and early
spring, ostensibly for the purpose of disrupting the spawning and recruitment of
rainbow trout.174  Such flows were conducted in 2003, 2004, and 2005.175  Of
course, one effect of such flows was to restore, for three months each winter in
those years, most of the peaking power generation that had been taken away by
the MLFF’s restrictions on daily flow fluctuations, but that was not the
Bureau’s publicly-stated purpose for instituting such flows.176
ASSESSMENT, at vi (2002), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/ea/gc/PropExp
ReleasesEA-09-2002.pdf [hereinafter 2002 FISH SUPPRESSION EA].
170 See supra text accompanying note 133.
171 See 2002 FISH SUPPRESSION EA, supra note 169, at 27.
172 See id. at 24.
173 See id. at 27.
174 Id. at 38-39.
175 SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
176 A proposal for similar flows prepared by the Western Area Power Administration, which
markets power from Glen Canyon Dam, labeled such flows “load following” flows, demon-
strating, if there was any doubt, that the similarity was not coincidental. See Alternative
Experimental Flow Regimes in WY 2002-2003 for Consideration by the TWG, Preliminary
Draft (Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/twg/mtgs/02mar20cc/
Attach3.pdf.
Although such flows were designed to disrupt rainbow trout spawning and recruitment,
they were nonetheless considered to likely be beneficial to the rainbow trout sport fishery,
which had suffered from an excessive number of small fish and a paucity of large fish.  It
was hoped that reducing the number of fish competing for the river’s limited food resources
would allow the remaining fish to grow bigger. See SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 38.
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H. The 2007 Grand Canyon Trust Lawsuit
In December 2007, the Grand Canyon Trust, one of the two environmental
organizations represented on the AMWG, filed a lawsuit against the Bureau of
Reclamation.177  The principal claim raised in the lawsuit is that the Bureau’s
continuing operation of Glen Canyon Dam under the MLFF regime, and its
failure to institute a regime of steady flows as required by the Fish & Wildlife
Service’s Reasonable and Prudent Alternative, is a violation of the Endangered
Species Act.178  As of this writing, the lawsuit is pending.
I. The 2008 Environmental Assessment and High Flow
In February 2008, the Bureau of Reclamation issued an environmental
assessment (“EA”) setting forth proposed experimental flows through Glen
Canyon Dam for the next five years, through the year 2012.179  The EA pro-
posed (1) a single sixty-hour high flow of 41,500 cfs in March 2008 and (2)
steady flows in September and October for the five years 2008–2012.180
Outside this period, the dam would continue to be operated under the MLFF
regime adopted by the Bureau’s Record of Decision in 1996.  The high flow
proposed in the EA was implemented in early March 2008.181
The proposal for two months of steady flows each year, if adopted, would
be a significant step towards the Bureau finally coming into compliance with
the Endangered Species Act.  But it would still fall substantially short of con-
formance with the Fish & Wildlife Service’s RPA, which required a program of
low steady flows in the summer as well as in the fall.182  And it falls even
farther short of compliance with the “hammer” clause of the RPA, which
required steady flows seven months of each year.183  Most important, the
Bureau has not shown that two months per year of stable nearshore and back-
water habitats is enough time to allow the growth and development of young
humpback chub that use those habitats.
The 2008 EA also includes significant indications that the Bureau still
does not recognize the mandatory nature of the Endangered Species Act’s
requirements and that it still treats other resources—hydroelectric power pro-
duction and non-native sport fisheries—with a higher priority than the law pro-
vides.  The EA explains that, despite the requirements of the RPA, the Bureau
177 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, No. 3:07-cv-08164-DGC (D. Ariz. Dec. 7, 2007).
178 See id. at 16-17 (First and Second Claims for Relief, alleging violations of ESA section
7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2000)).
179 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECLAMATION:  MANAGING
WATER IN THE WEST, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, EXPERIMENTAL RELEASES FROM GLEN
CANYON DAM, ARIZONA, 2008 THROUGH 2012 (2008), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/
envdocs/ea/gc/2008hfe/GCDexprelEA.pdf [hereinafter 2008 EXPERIMENTAL RELEASES EA].
180 Id. at 9-11.  The EA did not use the term “Beach/Habitat-Building Flow” (“BHBF”) to
describe the proposed high flow, but the nature and purpose of the high flow was essentially
the same as the BHBFs prescribed in the 1995 EIS. See supra Part IV.B.2.  However, the
2008 high flow lasted for only sixty hours, as opposed to the one to two week BHBFs
prescribed in the 1995 EIS.
181 See High Flow Experiment, supra note 69.
182 See supra text accompanying note 128.
183 See supra text accompanying note 133.
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avoided proposing low steady flows during the summer months because steady
flows at that time would have a greater impact on hydropower production than
in the fall.184  It also indicates that the timing of the proposed high-flow event
was chosen to minimize the public perception of harm to trout fishing opportu-
nities rather than to maximize benefits to the endangered chub.185
V. THE CAUSES OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S CONTINUING NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
As demonstrated in the narrative above, for the last dozen years, the
Bureau of Reclamation has failed to comply with the Reasonable and Prudent
Alternative set forth in the Fish & Wildlife Service’s 1994 Biological Opinion.
Under the RPA, the Bureau should have implemented a program including low
steady flows in the summer and fall beginning in 1997, but it did not.  Once the
Fish & Wildlife Service determined that the Bureau was not making sufficient
progress with respect to steady flows, the Bureau should have begun operating
Glen Canyon Dam according to the Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flows alterna-
tive, but again it did not.  Because the Bureau has failed to implement the RPA,
it has been operating Glen Canyon in a manner that the Fish & Wildlife Service
has determined jeopardizes the continued existence of the humpback chub and
adversely modifies the chub’s critical habitat.  The Bureau has therefore been
in violation of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
In memoranda to the Fish & Wildlife Service, the Bureau has offered two
reasons for its failure to implement the steady flows required by the RPA:  (1) a
purported need for additional research, analysis, planning, and collection of
baseline data before implementing low steady flows, and (2) delays caused by
the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program.  This Part discusses
these two purported reasons and concludes that the first does not justify the
Bureau’s failure to implement the RPA.  On the other hand, the AMP, which
effectively substitutes collaborative decisionmaking by a diverse group of
stakeholders for the legal requirements of the Endangered Species Act, has
played a significant role in facilitating, if not causing, the Bureau’s non-compli-
ance with the Act.
A. The Purported Need for Additional Research, Analysis, Planning, and
Baseline Data Collection
Ever since the Fish & Wildlife Service developed the RPA calling for a
program of steady flows, the Bureau of Reclamation has treated such flows as
an incompletely formed, novel, and risky proposal that it could not adopt with-
out years of additional study, planning, and analysis.  In its April 1995 letter
responding to the RPA, the Bureau stated:
A specific description of experimental flows needed to remove jeopardy must first be
developed based on the conceptual description and goals for these flows as outlined
in the Opinion.  The specific description must also meet the definition of a reasonable
and prudent alternative prior to implementation.  Specifically, these flows must be
184 2008 EXPERIMENTAL RELEASES EA, supra note 179, at 12.
185 See id. at 13.
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evaluated to insure they can be implemented in a manner consistent with the intended
purposes of the proposed action, are within the legal authority and jurisdiction of
Reclamation, and are economically and technologically feasible.
The plan to implement these flows will include scientifically based peer reviewed
criteria to measure and evaluate the impacts of the flows on endangered fish and
other resources.  It also must contain provisions and defined protocol to alter the
flows or return to previous flows if negative impacts to endangered fish or their
habitats occur.  We must also identify staff and funding levels necessary to conduct
the work and program those funds, as well as evaluate the potential benefits and risks
which may result.  The decision as to when and how to conduct appropriate endan-
gered fish flows will be based on this and other information.  Implementation will be
coordinated through the AMP.
A general implementation schedule for this element of the RPA has been prepared
and Reclamation is continuing the planning and budgeting necessary to allow experi-
mental fish flows of the type described in the Opinion to be implemented at the
earliest possible date.  We will continue to coordinate with the Service and other
stakeholders as the process moves forward.  However, it will be difficult at best to
implement the flows within the period of time recommended by the Service and we
therefore appreciate the provision for annual evaluation of sufficient progress.186
Subsequently, the Bureau commissioned a study by a private consulting firm
that concluded that “sufficient baseline data to fully evaluate the steady flow
experiment do not currently exist.”187  According to the Bureau, the report
identified eleven “significant data gaps” and recommended undertaking at least
two years of studies to fill those gaps before initiating any low steady flows.188
The Bureau stated that it was soliciting proposals from interested parties “to
develop a research and implementation plan” for experimental steady flows.189
Later still, in 2002 (seven years after it stated that it would implement the ele-
ments of the RPA), the Bureau reported that it had developed a proposal for a
“test of concept” of the steady flows required by the RPA, that it was con-
ducting additional research, that it had formed two committees on the subject,
and that it would “strive to have a complete program of experimental flows
developed” by later that year.190
The problem with the Bureau’s insistence on the need for additional plan-
ning and study before it can implement the steady flows required by the RPA is
that, during the many years it has been conducting this planning and study, the
Bureau has been operating Glen Canyon Dam under a prescription, the MLFF
alternative, that was itself never subjected to the years of additional planning
and study that the Bureau now claims are a prerequisite to steady flows.  The
MLFF alternative and the Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flows alternative were
186 BuRec Response to RPA, supra note 136, at 4.
187 Memorandum from Charles A. Calhoun, Reg’l Dir., Upper Colo. Reg’l Office, U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Phoenix, Ariz. 2-3 (Feb. 25, 1999) (on file with author).
188 Id. at 3.
189 Id.
190 Memorandum from Rick L. Gold, Reg’l Dir., Upper Colo. Reg’l Office, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
Phoenix, Ariz. 2-3 (May 8, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2002 Implementation
Status Memo].
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presented side-by-side in the Bureau’s 1995 EIS, were described with the same
level of specificity, and were subject to the same level of environmental analy-
sis.  The Bureau promptly adopted the MLFF alternative on completion of the
EIS, yet it subsequently claimed that steady flows could not be adopted without
years of additional study and planning.
Moreover, current operations under the MLFF regime, which cause the
level of the Colorado River in the Grand Canyon to rise and fall by three feet
every day in order to enhance the value of power production, are a major depar-
ture from the natural condition of the river, and have already been determined
by the Fish & Wildlife Service to jeopardize endangered native fish and
adversely modify their critical habitat.  Steady flows, in contrast, would simply
be an exercise in letting the river run, for limited times, in a manner that more
closely resembles the natural conditions under which the fish survived and
propagated for thousands of years.  To treat the MLFF as a safe, default posi-
tion, while treating steady flows as a radical departure, strains credibility.
The Bureau’s position that steady flows are an experiment that should not
be implemented without years of preparatory study and planning is also glar-
ingly inconsistent with the Bureau’s willingness to adopt, with relatively little
study and planning, the severely fluctuating “non-native fish suppression
flows” that were implemented in 2003, 2004, and 2005, for three months each
time.191  These flows were a much more radical experiment, in the sense that
they involved a much greater artificial manipulation of the river environment,
than either the MLFF alternative or the steady flows required by the RPA.
They also depended on the previously untested hypothesis that they would ben-
efit, rather than harm, native fish by reducing non-native fish populations.
Nonetheless, they were planned and executed in a remarkably short time.  After
a problem was identified based on scientific data and analyses published in
2001 and 2002,192 an environmental assessment was published in September
2002,193 the severely fluctuating flows were initiated in January 2003, and they
were carried out for a total of nine months over the next three years.194  In
contrast, except for a single three-month period in 2000, low steady flows have
yet to be implemented, even though steady flows were analyzed in an EIS and
required by a Biological Opinion that was published over a dozen years ago.  It
is hard to resist the conclusion that the amount of planning and analysis
required by the Bureau before initiating a change in the management of Glen
Canyon Dam depends, not on how that change may affect endangered species,
but rather on whether that change would increase or decrease the production of
peaking power by the dam’s generators.195
191 See supra text accompanying notes 174-76.
192 See 2002 FISH SUPPRESSION EA, supra note 169.
193 Id.
194 SCORE REPORT, supra note 8, at 8.
195 Professor Adler notes, and I concur, that the AMP has effectively reversed the burden of
proof established by NEPA and the ESA, treating management harmful to endangered fish as
the status quo while putting a heavy burden on those who advocate management changes
designed to restore some semblance of the natural aquatic environment for the benefit of the
fish. See Adler, supra note 80, at 96.  Professor Adler later concludes that our environmen-
tal laws lack the flexibility needed to implement restoration adaptively. See id. at 102.  I
would state the latter point somewhat differently.  The history of the AMP demonstrates that
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ308.txt unknown Seq: 35 18-JUL-08 13:53
930 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:896
B. The Effect of the Adaptive Management Program
The second excuse offered by the Bureau for its failure to implement the
low steady flows required by the RPA was the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive
Management Program.  In a 2002 memorandum to the Fish & Wildlife Service
reporting on the status of the Bureau’s implementation of the Service’s 1994
Biological Opinion, the Bureau wrote:  “The longer than anticipated period for
developing this program is attributable largely to its being made a part of the
adaptive management process.”196  The Bureau repeated this statement in a
similar memorandum in 2004.197  Examination of the function, structure, and
recent voting of the Adaptive Management Work Group suggests that it has
indeed been a significant factor contributing to the Bureau’s failure to imple-
ment the steady flows required by the Fish & Wildlife Service’s Biological
Opinion in 1994.
1. Function of the AMP
As described above, the heart of the AMP is the Adaptive Management
Work Group, a federal advisory committee that, among other things, provides
recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior regarding modifications to the
operations of Glen Canyon Dam.198  As will be discussed below, the AMWG
has never recommended to the Secretary that the Bureau implement the low
steady flows required by the Fish & Wildlife Service’s RPA, and an over-
whelming majority of the AMWG recently voted against a motion to recom-
mend adoption of Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flows as required by the
“hammer” clause of the RPA.199  Thus, in a very direct sense, the AMWG has
been a force against implementation of the RPA.
Of course, as an advisory committee, the AMWG has no legal authority to
mandate or veto changes in dam operations, nor can its recommendations
excuse a violation of the Endangered Species Act by the Bureau of Reclama-
tion.  Nonetheless, the Interior Department has assigned the AMWG a role that
far exceeds simply providing advice.  It has described the AMWG as the “key”
to the AMP, and the AMP is the Bureau’s program for deciding on possible
changes to future dam operations:
All of the elements are now in place for an effective, credible adaptive manage-
ment effort.  The AMWG is the key; the TWG [Technical Work Group] providing
detailed guidance on issues and objectives; the Science Center to conduct the
environmental laws can be manipulated to freeze in existing management and thereby block
restoration.  But, as the rapid implementation of the “non-native fish suppression flows”
demonstrated, those laws have not prevented quick action when such action benefits
entrenched interests, in this case electric power production.  Perhaps the best conclusion is
simply that, with respect to the Colorado River, environmental laws have not yet upset the
balance of power that has favored water supply and hydroelectricity over endangered species
protection.
196 2002 Implementation Status Memo, supra note 190, at 2.
197 Memorandum from Rick L. Gold, Reg’l Dir., Upper Colo. Reg’l Office, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
Phoenix, Ariz. 2 (May 5, 2004) (on file with author).
198 See supra text accompanying note 148.
199 See supra text accompanying note 133.
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research and monitoring needed to evaluate operations; and the independent review
panel, the outside review necessary to provide the credible science.
The AMWG continues public involvement in the decision-making process and
incorporates those stakeholders with interest in the operation of Glen Canyon Dam
and downstream resources.  By blending the best science and management practices,
the AMWG makes recommendations to the Secretary on how to protect the resources
and meet the requirement of the law.200
Given the resources and the credibility that the Interior Department has
invested in the AMP, to which the AMWG is the “key,” and given its claim
that the AMWG “blend[s] the best science and management practices,” the
Interior Department would be hard-pressed to turn around and ignore its
recommendations.
The extent to which the AMP has actually caused, rather than acted as a
public excuse for, the Bureau’s failure to comply with the Fish & Wildlife
Service’s RPA cannot be known without reading the minds of the Bureau’s
decisionmakers (or their superiors in the Interior Department and the White
House).  But given the Bureau’s own statements that its failure to timely imple-
ment low steady flows is “attributable largely” to the AMP, it is fair to say that
the AMP has at least facilitated (by providing an excuse), if not caused, the
Bureau’s prolonged non-compliance with the Endangered Species Act.
2. The Structure of the AMP
Given the structure of the AMP, there is no reason to expect any corre-
spondence between the recommendations it generates and the requirements of
the Endangered Species Act or any other law.  While the law governing Glen
Canyon Dam creates a hierarchy of resources and uses, with water supply and
storage and endangered species protection given the highest priority and hydro-
electric power production and non-native species given lower priorities, the
structure of the AMP does not reflect that hierarchy.  The AMWG, which over-
sees the AMP and makes recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior, is
designed to reflect the interests of a broad variety of stakeholders, not to
achieve compliance with the law.  The composition of the AMWG is as
follows:
7 representatives from the state governments in the Colorado River Basin
(one each from Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,
Utah, and Wyoming)
6 representatives from Native American governments (Hopi Tribe,
Hualapai Tribe, Navajo Nation, Pueblo of Zuni, San Juan Southern Pai-
ute Tribe, and Kaibab Band of Paiute Indians)
5 representatives from federal agencies (Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau
of Reclamation, Department of Energy, Fish and Wildlife Service, and
National Park Service)
2 representatives from environmental organizations (Grand Canyon Trust
and Grand Canyon Wildlands Council)
200 Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program – Background Reclamation UC
Region, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/background.html#background (last visited May 17,
2008).
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2 representatives from recreational organizations (Federation of Fly Fish-
ers and Grand Canyon River Guides)
2 representatives from organizations of purchasers of electric power from
Glen Canyon Dam (Colorado River Energy Distributors Association
and Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems)
1 representative from the Arizona Game and Fish Department.201
Thus, of the twenty-five entities represented on the AMWG, only five (the two
environmental organizations, the Fish & Wildlife Service, the National Park
Service, and the Arizona Game and Fish Department) have institutional mis-
sions that can be expected to lead them to place a high priority on protection of
endangered species of fish.202
The AMWG is supported by a Technical Work Group (“TWG”) that pro-
vides advice and recommendations to the AMWG on scientific and technical
issues, but the TWG, despite its title, is not actually a scientific or technical
committee.  It comprises one representative from each of the same twenty-five
entities that are represented on the AMWG itself.  Although these representa-
tives are supposed to be “technical,” the TWG is, in essence, another stake-
holder committee that simply mirrors the AMWG in composition.
3. Bringing the Issue to a Head:  A Recent Vote of the AMWG
A recent vote of the AMWG brought into sharp focus the conflict between
the multi-stakeholder composition of the AMWG and the legal priority that is
supposed to be given to protection of endangered species.  At an AMWG meet-
ing on August 30, 2007, the representative of the Grand Canyon Trust, one of
the two environmental representatives on the committee, moved that the com-
mittee recommend to the Secretary of the Interior that Glen Canyon Dam be
operated under a regime of Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flows, i.e., essentially
what is required by the “hammer” clause of the RPA issued by the Fish &
Wildlife Service over a dozen years ago.  The motion was defeated by a vote of
thirteen to four, with four representatives abstaining and three absent.203  Vot-
ing for the motion, besides the Grand Canyon Trust, were the representatives of
the Grand Canyon River Guides, the National Park Service, and the Fish &
Wildlife Service.  Votes against the motion included the representatives of all
of the basin states, the Bureau of Reclamation and its power marketer the West-
ern Area Power Administration, electric power companies, the Federation of
201 See Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program – AMWG Members, Reclama-
tion UC Region, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/amwg_members.html (last visited
May 17, 2008).
202 I have not included the Federation of Fly Fishers or the Grand Canyon River Guides in
this count because the humpback chub is not a sport fish and is generally not viewable by
boaters in the Grand Canyon.  Moreover, at least one of the entities included in this count,
the Arizona Game and Fish Department, has an institutional mission that includes promotion
of sport fisheries, including the rainbow trout fishery on the Colorado River whose mainte-
nance may conflict with protection of the chub.
203 E-mail from Linda Whetton, Mgmt. Analyst, Upper Colo. Region, U.S. Bureau of Rec-
lamation, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior to the author (Oct. 9, 2007) (on file with author) (with
attached spreadsheet); see also Letter from Nikolai Ramsey, Grand Canyon Trust, to Dirk
Kempthorne, Sec’y of the Interior (Sept. 18, 2007) (on file with author) (containing a minor-
ity report on the defeated motion).
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Fly Fishers, and the Pueblo of Zuni.204  Thus, the voice of the Fish & Wildlife
Service, the agency authorized by the Endangered Species Act to determine
what changes in dam operations are needed to prevent extinction of the hump-
back chub, was reduced to one of four dissenting votes against an overwhelm-
ing committee majority determined to avoid making those changes.
VI. HOW ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM WENT WRONG
The Adaptive Management Program for Glen Canyon Dam has given
adaptive management a bad name by causing, or at least facilitating, extended
non-compliance with the Endangered Species Act by the Bureau of Reclama-
tion.  It did not have to be that way.  There is no inherent inconsistency
between the concept of adaptive management and compliance with the Endan-
gered Species Act.  Indeed, adaptive management can be a valuable tool for
ESA compliance.  But the Adaptive Management Program for Glen Canyon
Dam went wrong in two critical ways.  First, the program conflated the concept
of adaptive management with the logically separate concept of collaborative
management by a variety of stakeholders.  While there may be much to say for
(and against) collaborative stakeholder management in general, it is not a nec-
essary component of adaptive management, and, in the case of Glen Canyon
Dam, the effort to make decisions acceptable to a broad spectrum of stakehold-
ers has undermined the priority that the law places on certain interests above
others.  Second, the program adopted the wrong starting point for adaptive
management.  It should have started with the legally-mandated Reasonable and
Prudent Alternative developed by the Fish & Wildlife Service, and then modi-
fied that alternative if and when it proved ineffective in protecting and enhanc-
ing endangered fish and their habitat.  Instead, it began with an alternative that
the Fish & Wildlife Service had already determined would cause jeopardy to
endangered fish and adversely modify their critical habitat.
A. Conflating Adaptive Management with Collaborative Management
Adaptive management has been defined by the Department of the Interior
as follows:
Adaptive management is a systematic approach for improving resource manage-
ment by learning from management outcomes. . . .  An adaptive approach involves
exploring alternative ways to meet management objectives, predicting the outcomes
of alternatives based on the current state of knowledge, implementing one or more of
these alternatives, monitoring to learn about the impacts of management actions, and
then using the results to update knowledge and adjust management actions.205
Thus defined, adaptive management is perfectly consistent with the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act and other federal laws, including
the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).  An Environmental Impact
Statement prepared pursuant to NEPA is an instrument for exploring alternative
204 The other Native American tribal representatives abstained or were absent.
205 BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE 1 (2007), available at http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/Adaptive
Management/TechGuide.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL GUIDE] .
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ways to meet management objectives.206  A Biological Opinion prepared pur-
suant to section 7 of the ESA,207 as well as the EIS, is an instrument for “pre-
dicting the outcomes of alternatives based on the current state of knowledge.”
Monitoring the effects of management actions, though not required by NEPA
or the ESA, can also certainly contribute to achieving their goals by facilitating
corrective action when outcomes differ from predictions.  And “using the
results to update knowledge and adjust management actions” can be achieved
through a supplement to the EIS208 and re-initiation of section 7
consultation.209
Unfortunately, however, the Interior Department’s definition of adaptive
management also adds another element, which is less consistent with the ESA:
Adaptive management requires the participation of stakeholders.  Stakeholders
include people and organizations who use, influence, and have an interest, or “stake,”
in a given resource.  Stakeholders should be involved early in the adaptive manage-
ment cycle, to help assess the problem and design activities to solve it.  Stakeholders
also can help to implement and monitor those activities, and participate in the evalua-
tion of results.  Involvement of stakeholders from the beginning increases manage-
ment effectiveness and the likelihood of achieving agreed-upon outcomes.210
While collaboration among stakeholders may be an attractive concept
from many perspectives, it is not a logical or necessary part of the definition of
adaptive management.211  Monitoring the effects of management actions and
incorporating the results of that monitoring into future management decisions
can be performed by an agency or by a group of experts; it does not require the
collaboration of stakeholders.212  And while the notion of a partnership
206 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C)(iii), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2000) (requiring consideration of alternatives).
207 See Endangered Species Act § 7(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (2000).
208 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (2006).
209 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16 (2006).
210 TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 205, at 4-5 (citations and emphasis omitted).
211 Professor Adler also argues that adaptive management and stakeholder collaboration are
two distinct concepts, and that the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program has
improvidently merged the two.  “[M]erging those goals [stakeholder collaboration and adap-
tive management] into a single interactive process serves neither goal well, and fundamen-
tally misconstrues the concept of adaptive management.” Adler, supra note 80, at 103.
Collaborative management by stakeholders should not be confused with providing
opportunities for, and consideration of, public input.  This author has argued that public
input is essential to informed agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Joseph M. Feller, Grazing
Management on the Public Lands:  Opening the Process to Public Participation, 26 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 571 (1991).  Moreover, the Grand Canyon Protection Act requires the Secre-
tary of the Interior to consult with the public, including the parties represented on the
AMWG. See Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992 §§ 1804(c)(3), 1805(c), Pub. L. No.
102-575, 106 Stat. 4600, 4671-72.  But consultation with various parties and consideration
of their input is not the same thing as deference to a majority or consensus of their views.
The purpose of seeking public input should be to ensure that agency decisionmakers are fully
informed, not to ensure that their decisions are acceptable to all, or a majority of, interested
parties.
212 See, e.g., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling
ed., 1978); CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES (1986).
These two works, which are described as “seminal” by the Interior Department’s Adaptive
Management Technical Guide, TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 205, at 1, extensively describe
and discuss adaptive management processes, but do not include stakeholder collaboration as
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between managers and stakeholders may appear benign, it can result, and in the
case of Glen Canyon Dam it has resulted, in a shift in management direction
from the requirements of the law to the needs and desires of the stakeholders.
The placement of a stakeholder committee at the center of the adaptive
management process has directed the process towards satisfying the demands
of the stakeholders rather than meeting the requirements of the law.  As the
quotation above suggests, a committee of stakeholders will work toward out-
comes that the stakeholders can agree upon, which may not be the outcomes
required by the law.  Or as the Bureau has stated, somewhat wishfully, on its
website:  “The AMWG makes it possible for the Secretary to bring all these
varied interests to a consensus on how to protect downstream resources and
strike a wise balance on river operations.”213  However, the law does not call
for the Secretary to “strike a wise balance.”  Rather, it contains specific direc-
tions that give priority to certain interests, namely, water supply and endan-
gered species protection.  The search for consensus on a “wise balance” ignores
these legal mandates.
In effect, the Adaptive Management Program has elevated social engineer-
ing goals—communication, understanding, cooperation, and consensus among
stakeholders—over the recovery of endangered species.214  A Department of
the Interior report on the program touts its achievements in improving “[t]he
degree of stakeholder buy-in and cooperation,” in creating “successful collabo-
ration between diverse stakeholders,” and in giving them “input throughout the
process, which improves their trust when decisions are made.”215  The report
explains:
Stakeholders who in the past might have resolved their differences in the legal sys-
tem, at very large cost, now are working together to achieve a set of common objec-
tives.  They also have agreed to be patient and risk-tolerant. . . .  The 25 stakeholders
in the [AMP] are very engaged in the program.  Attendance at and engagement in
a necessary component of such processes.  The former work, at pages 140-297, presents five
case studies of adaptive environmental assessment and management, none of which involves
a stakeholder committee.
A third work described as “seminal” in the Technical Guide does place heavy emphasis
on negotiation among diverse parties. See KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE:  INTE-
GRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 87-114 (1993).  But even Professor
Lee treats adaptive management (the “compass”) and negotiation (the “gyroscope”) as sepa-
rate concepts.  He cites commercial fishery regulation by a regulatory authority, not a stake-
holder committee, as a hypothetical example of the application of adaptive management.
See id. at 53.  Professor Lee advocates negotiation between stakeholders as a process for
policy development. See id. at 87-114.  But where Congress has set policy through legisla-
tion such as the Endangered Species Act, it is unlawful for the Bureau of Reclamation to
develop an alternative, contrary policy through a stakeholder process.  (Professor Lee’s work
is openly hostile to the Endangered Species Act, describing it as an example of “tragic
choice.” See id. at 94-96.)
213 Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program – Adaptive Managemnent Work-
Group Main Page, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/amwg_index.html (last visited
May 17, 2008).
214 Professor Lee also uses the term “social engineering” to describe his concept of adaptive
management. See LEE, supra note 212, at xii.
215 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Program, at 5-6,
available at http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/AdaptiveManagement/documents/glencanyon
dam.pdf.
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meetings has been and continues to be very good.  Stakeholders have achieved a
degree of respect for the positions of one another and they share a commitment to
using science to achieve a better understanding of the relationship between dam oper-
ations and Colorado River resources.216
The report concedes, however, that the goals of actually improving habitat for,
and recovering the population of, the endangered humpback chub have proven
“challenging” and that “[d]uring the course of the [AMP], both recruitment of
this fish and population levels of adults have declined.”217  The report con-
cludes that “[t]he net effect [of the Adaptive Management Program] may not be
to speed the process so much as to assure that there is greater agreement on the
outcome.”218
From the perspective of the hierarchy of laws governing management of
Glen Canyon Dam, a committee of multifarious stakeholders is peculiarly
unsuited to make recommendations regarding the management of the dam.
These laws provide essentially two mandates, one governing total annual
releases of water from the dam and the other effectively governing seasonal and
daily variations.  A stakeholder committee is not well-suited to achieving com-
pliance with either mandate.
Total annual releases from Glen Canyon Dam are governed by the provi-
sions of the Colorado River Compact, the Boulder Canyon Project Act, and
other laws regarding the division of water between the Upper and Lower Basin
states.  In a process completely separate from the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive
Management Program, the Department of the Interior recently adopted detailed
guidelines for annual releases that are designed to ensure compliance with
those requirements.219  These guidelines, which were recommended to the
Department of the Interior by the seven basin states, will govern annual
releases from the dam, leaving no role for a stakeholder committee.
As for seasonal and daily fluctuations, the task facing the Bureau is to
choose, within the constraint imposed by the total annual release requirements,
that seasonal and daily flow pattern that has the greatest likelihood of conserv-
ing and restoring endangered fish populations, particularly the humpback chub,
and their habitat.  Making that choice is an extraordinarily difficult problem
requiring expertise and judgment in fisheries biology, hydrology, sedi-
mentology, and other disciplines.  And a process of experimentation and adap-
tation may be an excellent process for finding the right choice.  But it is hard to
see how finding the right choice will be, or has been, aided by a stakeholder
committee consisting of twenty-five individuals who were chosen, not because
of their expertise in these fields, but because they represent various interest
groups, most of whose primary concerns have nothing to do with fish.
Such stakeholder committees may be appropriate tools for implementing
legal mandates that call for balancing a variety of interests, such as the “multi-
216 Id. at 6.
217 Id. at 5.
218 Id. at 6.
219 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION—COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDE-
LINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POW-
ELL AND LAKE MEAD 1 (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-3\NVJ308.txt unknown Seq: 42 18-JUL-08 13:53
Spring 2008] MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM 937
ple use” mandate that governs National Forests and lands managed by the
Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”).220  But where the law gives priority to
certain interests over others, giving a central role to such a committee obscures
that priority and creates an opportunity for lower-priority interests to attempt to
gain through the committee what they lost in the legislature.
B. Starting Off on the Wrong Foot
Besides conflating the concepts of adaptive and collaborative manage-
ment, the Adaptive Management Program for Glen Canyon Dam has facilitated
non-compliance with the Endangered Species Act by allowing the Bureau of
Reclamation to implement a management alternative that does not comport
with the ESA while claiming that it will someday come into compliance
through adaptation.  That is, instead of starting with the Reasonable and Pru-
dent Alternative developed by the Fish & Wildlife Service and modifying it if it
proves ineffective in recovering the humpback chub, the Bureau started with
the alternative (MLFF) that the Service found unlawful and answered criticisms
with promises to later consider modifying its management through the Adap-
tive Management Program.221  The Bureau apparently believes that, because
under adaptive management all management decisions are provisional, it can
get away with starting with any alternative it chooses as long as it promises to
consider modifications in the future through the Adaptive Management
Program.
The problem with this approach is that the Adaptive Management Pro-
gram, despite its purported flexibility, is in fact overwhelmingly biased towards
continuance of the management alternative that it starts with.  Any recommen-
dation for a change in management of the dam requires a two-thirds vote of the
AMWG.222  If two-thirds of the members of the AMWG cannot agree on, say,
the low steady flows in the summer and fall required by the RPA, then manage-
ment defaults to the MLFF, regardless of whether the AMWG agrees to the
MLFF.  Moreover, before it even gets to a vote of the AMWG, any proposed
change in management can be delayed through years of committee meetings,
subcommittee meetings, and environmental analysis.  But the MLFF gets a free
pass because it is treated now as the “no action” alternative, requiring no com-
mittee meetings, no study, and no approval by the AMWG.223
The combination of the cumbersome nature of the Adaptive Management
Program and the requirement of a two-thirds vote of the AMWG to recommend
any change in dam operations has not only facilitated non-compliance with the
220 See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000) (defining “multiple use” for the BLM as, among other
things, “the management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they
are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the Ameri-
can people” and “a combination of balanced and diverse resource uses”); 16 U.S.C. § 531(a)
(2000) (similar definition for National Forests).
221 See, e.g., 1996 RECORD OF DECISION, supra note 145, at 3-4, 8-9.
222 Operating Procedures of the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive Management Work Group,
Jan. 17, 2002, at 3, available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/amwg/pdfs/OP_02apr24.
pdf.
223 See, e.g., 2008 EXPERIMENTAL RELEASES EA, supra note 179, at 8 (treating MLFF as
the “no action” alternative).
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Endangered Species Act, it has also been antithetical to the concept of adaptive
management, which is supposed to be based on experimentation and adapta-
tion.  Instead of encouraging adaptation, the Adaptive Management Program
has entrenched existing management of the dam and served as an excuse for the
Bureau of Reclamation’s failure to change that management.  Given the effec-
tive rigging of the process in favor of continuance of the MLFF, it is no wonder
that it remains the dominant management regime fourteen years after it was
found unlawful by the Fish & Wildlife Service.
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR LAWFUL, ADAPTIVE, NON-COLLABORATIVE
MANAGEMENT OF GLEN CANYON DAM
Management of Glen Canyon Dam can be harmonized with the Endan-
gered Species Act and other applicable laws, as well as with principles of adap-
tive management, by correcting the two fundamental flaws identified in the
previous part of this Article.  Specifically:
(1) As soon as practicable, the Bureau of Reclamation should begin oper-
ating the dam under a regime of Seasonally Adjusted Steady Flows during the
months of April through October of each year, as prescribed in the Reasonable
and Prudent Alternative presented in the Fish & Wildlife Service’s 1994 Bio-
logical Opinion.  This prescription is also the same as that proposed in the
failed motion that was supported by the Grand Canyon Trust, the U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, and Grand Canyon River Guides at
the August 2007 AMWG meeting.  This flow regime would be the starting
point for future adaptive management of Glen Canyon Dam.  If this flow
regime fails to improve spawning and recruitment of humpback chub, depar-
tures from this regime could be implemented through the Adaptive Manage-
ment Program.
(2) The AMWG and the TWG should be abolished.  Funds currently
devoted to the AMWG and the TWG should be used to create a special unit
within the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service dedicated to adaptive management of
Glen Canyon Dam.  This unit would comprise fisheries biologists, hydrologists,
sedimentologists, and other specialists in disciplines relevant to the conserva-
tion of the humpback chub and other endangered species and their habitats in
the Grand Canyon.  This special unit would be responsible for annually review-
ing and revising the Reasonable and Prudent Alternative in the 1994 Biological
Opinion to incorporate, and adapt to, the latest information on the effects of
dam operations on endangered species and their habitat.  The annually revised
RPA, which could include experimental departures from the SASF regime,
would take the place of the AMWG’s recommendations on modifications of
dam operations.
In order to comply with the Colorado River Compact, the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, and other laws governing use and storage of Colorado River water,
the special unit of the Fish & Wildlife Service should be instructed that its
recommendations for dam operations must be constrained by the total annual
release volumes prescribed by the Interior Department’s Colorado River
Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the Coordinated Operations
for Lake Powell and Lake Mead, or such other guidelines for annual releases
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that may be developed by the Department in the future.  Within that constraint,
the special unit would make recommendations for monthly and daily flow
patterns.
(3) In order to comply with the Grand Canyon Protection Act’s consulta-
tion requirements, all of the entities currently represented on the AMWG, as
well as the public, should be provided with reasonable notice of, and opportu-
nity to comment on, drafts of the special unit’s recommendations on dam oper-
ations before those recommendations are finalized and presented to the
Secretary.
(4) The roles of the Grand Canyon Monitoring and Research Center224 and
the Independent Review Panel225 should continue essentially unchanged,
except that the Center and the Panel would support, and make recommenda-
tions to, the special unit of the Fish & Wildlife Service rather than the AMWG.
CONCLUSION
The concept of collaboration and consensus among stakeholders is an
attractive one, and it is perhaps not surprising that it has caught on in a big way
among natural resource agencies.  But we must not forget that ours is a govern-
ment of laws, and that citizens have a right to expect that agencies will respect
those laws, even when they require outcomes that displease large and powerful
elements of the agencies’ constituencies.
The Adaptive Management Program for Glen Canyon Dam, as currently
constituted, gives too central a role to a committee of stakeholders and places
too little emphasis on adherence to the priorities created by the laws governing
operation of the dam.  The program’s emphasis on seeking collaboration and
consensus among stakeholders is neither supported by existing law nor necessi-
tated by the concept of adaptive management.  Adaptive management is consis-
tent with the laws governing dam operations, but the goal of such adaptive
management should be dictated by the requirements of those laws, not by the
needs and desires of various stakeholders.
Under existing law, the top priorities in dam operations are meeting the
water supply mandates of the Colorado River Compact and associated laws,
and conservation of endangered species.  These two priorities are compatible,
but neither priority requires, or is well-served by, the stakeholder committee at
the heart of the existing Adaptive Management Program.  The former priority is
addressed by the annual water release guidelines that have been developed
outside the Adaptive Management Program.  Within the constraints of those
guidelines, seasonal and daily flow patterns should be determined by an adap-
tive management program structured for the specific purpose of protecting
endangered species rather than seeking collaboration and consensus among
stakeholders.
This Article’s insistence on legal compliance may be viewed by some as
an archaic and inflexible reaction against a new, innovative, and promising par-
adigm of public resource management.  To this view, I offer two brief
224 See GLEN CANYON DAM EIS, supra note 104, at 36-37; Grand Canyon Monitoring and
Research Center, http://www.gcmrc.gov/ (last visited May 17, 2008).
225 See GLEN CANYON DAM EIS, supra note 104, at 37-38.
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responses.  First, the democratic values that purportedly motivate proposals for
stakeholder management also demand respect for the laws passed by the Con-
gress that was elected by the public.  In the broadest sense, all of the American
people are stakeholders in the Grand Canyon and in the fish, wildlife, and other
natural resources therein.  These stakeholders have chosen Congress to
represent them, and disobedience to the mandates of Congress disempowers
them.
Second, in practice, the stakeholder-driven Adaptive Management Pro-
gram for Glen Canyon Dam has not been innovative at all.  Because it has, in
effect, made a two-thirds vote of a large stakeholder committee a prerequisite
to changes in dam operations, it has served to entrench existing dam manage-
ment and prevent the kind of adaptation and experimentation that is supposed
to be the hallmark of adaptive management.  Ironically, strict adherence to the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act would likely result in management
that is more adaptive than current management, which is “adaptive” in name
only.
EPILOGUE
On February 27, 2008, as this Article was nearing completion, the U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service issued a Biological Opinion on the Bureau of Reclama-
tion’s proposed five-year (2008–2012) plan for flows from Glen Canyon
Dam.226  This new Biological Opinion concludes that the proposed plan, which
would continue implementation of the MLFF alternative except for a single
high-flow event in 2008 and steady flows in September and October each year,
would not jeopardize the continued existence of the humpback chub or
adversely modify its critical habitat.227  This new Biological Opinion also
states that it replaces the 1994 Biological Opinion that concluded that the
MLFF alternative would jeopardize the chub and adversely modify its critical
habitat.228  In effect, therefore, this new Biological Opinion purports to release
the Bureau from its obligation to implement the more extensive steady flows
required by the previous opinion.
The primary reason stated in the new opinion for the Service’s change of
position is that the population of humpback chub in the Grand Canyon, which
had been declining, has stabilized and increased in the last few years.  The
current estimated population of about 6000 adult fish, while less than the popu-
lation in 1994 when the previous Biological Opinion was issued, is an increase
over the 3000–5000 adult fish estimated to have been present at the low point
in 2002.  The Service concluded that this recent upturn in the adult chub popu-
226 Memorandum from Field Supervisor, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, Phoenix, Ariz., to Deputy Reg’l Dir., U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Upper Colo.
Region, Salt Lake City, Utah, (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.usbr.gov/uc/envdocs/
bo/FinalGCDBO2-26-08.pdf [hereinafter Final BO Memorandum].  For a discussion of the
five-year plan, see supra Part IV.I.
227 Final BO Memorandum, supra note 226, at 51.
228 Id. at 2.
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lation is a delayed result of increased recruitment of young fish that must have
occurred in the late 1990s.229
While the reasons for the increased recruitment in the late 1990s are
unknown, the Service also concluded that more recent developments—
increased water temperature resulting from drought-induced lowering of the
level of Lake Powell, efforts to remove non-native rainbow trout, and the low
steady flow experiment conducted in 2000—ought to have improved the pros-
pects for spawning and recruitment.  Thus, the Service reasoned, if the popula-
tion has increased in the last few years as a delayed result of increased
recruitment in the late 1990s under the MLFF regime, it can be expected to
increase even more in the next few years as a delayed result of the more
favorable conditions that existed under the MLFF regime in the first few years
of the current decade.  Therefore, according to the new Biological Opinion,
continuance of the MLFF regime for another five years, with the addition of
steady flows in September and October, should not threaten the continued exis-
tence of the chub.230
Because it replaces the 1994 Biological Opinion and its RPA, the new
Biological Opinion may render moot much of this Article’s legal argument that
the Bureau has been violating the Endangered Species Act by failing to follow
that RPA.  But the new Opinion has not resolved the controversy over the
dam’s effects on the endangered humpback chub.  The Grand Canyon Trust has
amended its pending lawsuit to add the Fish & Wildlife Service as a defendant
and to allege, among other things, that the Bureau’s new five-year plan and the
new Opinion approving it are arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the Endan-
gered Species Act and the Grand Canyon Protection Act.231  The Superinten-
dent of Grand Canyon National Park has also implicitly denounced the
Bureau’s plan by calling on the Bureau to reform dam operations to include
high flow events every year or two and steady flows during the summer (as
opposed to the plan’s single high flow event and fall-only steady flows) for the
benefit of the humpback chub.232  Finally, the new Opinion does not change the
central thesis of this Article, namely, that the Bureau’s Adaptive Management
Program for Glen Canyon Dam has substituted the needs and desires of a group
of stakeholders for the hierarchy of laws that should govern operation of the
dam and that, for many years, the program facilitated non-compliance with the
Endangered Species Act.
229 Id. at 51-52.
230 Id.
231 Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Grand Canyon Trust v.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 07-cv-08164-DGC, at 23-24 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2008).
232 April Reese, Colorado River:  High Flows Should Run Regularly to Restore Grand Can-
yon Resources, Park Chief Says, LAND LETTER, Apr. 10, 2008, available at http://www.
eenews.net/Landletter/2008/04/10/4 (subscription required).
